Page - 313 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Gorlice–Tarnów 313 The Austro-Hungarian troops reacted overwhelmingly positively to the sudden, very strong German presence. Their confidence grew and not only in the immediate vicinity of the German deployment zone, but along the entire front. When the Commander of the Swiss Mountain Brigade No. 18, Colonel Bridler, journeyed to the Carpathians in the context of one of his regular tours of the theatres of war, he summarised his impressions for the Swiss General Staff as follows : ‘At the front there is a confident, triumphant and assured mood ; however, in the case of the (German) Beskid Corps to a greater extent than with the Imperial and Royal troops. Among the latter, the Hun- garians distinguish themselves by virtue of their fervent patriotism and enthusiasm for battle. They recognise the Reich German troops as the protectors and liberators of their country, and they make no pretence of their greater sympathy for them than for the German Austrians. […] I have noticed the unfavourable factor for the fighting that neither the Hungarians nor the German Austrians hate the Russians and immediately abandon the battle against the latter, as well as how they raise their hands, even if this happens only just before they are stormed. […] In the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy, only the Italian is hated from time to time, though with ferocity. […] I have the impression that a war with Italy would be fought with murderous passion.’742 From 21 April the German formations rolled towards Galicia and into their staging areas. Secrecy proved to be a particular problem, and it almost seems that the Army High Command also wanted to keep the impending offensive secret from Vienna, whilst the presence of German troop masses on the front could not be kept secret and was spotted both by the Polish population in the deployment zone and by the Russians. The Russians ultimately also knew about the day of attack, 2 May.743 The plan for this operation, named the Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive, doubtlessly has a long prehistory, and it is almost pointless to trace its entire ramifications. The quintes- sence that emerges, however, is an explanation of an Austro-Hungarian and German controversy, since both Conrad and Falkenhayn claimed the credit for having the idea for this plan. But the German side also claimed for itself the ‘Napoleonic’ idea of many offensives. Thus, above all General Wild von Hohenborn accredited himself with the merits of having persuaded Falkenhayn to attack in the Carpathian foothills rather than over the upper Vistula River.744 However, successes always have many fathers. One can best do justice to the provenance of the plan if one incorporates two components, namely the operational idea of Conrad of a large-scale envelopment into the east, which already dated back to summer 1914, and a second complementary component, namely the planning of Falkenhayn, who wanted to begin a direct thrust to the east from the area around Gorlice, i.e. precisely that for which the Austrian operational command and tactics have been repeatedly criticised. In these two operational conceptions, not only was something visible that emerged from a specific situation in April 1915 and from the theatre of war ; something fundamental had also been introduced. For the