Page - 314 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

314 The First Winter of the War Austro-Hungarian Army, even before the era of Conrad the frontal thrust and the one-sided envelopment had assumed almost doctrinaire character in both tactics and operations and, likewise, the pincer operation had become doctrine for the German op- erational command. The departure from the German conception can thus be regarded as an additional indication that Conrad played a substantial role in the planning for the Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive, even if Falkenhayn was the one who had been decisive in putting it into practice. In a type of synthesis, Wild von Hohenborn ultimately sum- marised the facts  – though he only wrote to his wife  – to the effect that : ‘By the way, we want to clarify the matter historically among ourselves along the lines that Conrad appears to have had the idea first and independently of me to overthrow the Carpathian front by means of a breakthrough to the north. He appears to have communicated this in general to Falkenhayn.’745 Yet it was not just a case of drafting a joint operational plan but ultimately also of what the command would look like for this offensive. This became a matter of pres- tige. Finally, as a compromise, the Imperial and Royal 4th Army was subordinated to the command of the new German 11th Army, whilst in compensation its commander, General von Mackensen, was formally bound to the orders of the Austrian High Com- mand. The Army High Command, in turn, was supposed to seek out the agreement of the German Supreme Army Command in all important decisions. This meant that the Army High Command  – with all its plans and intentions  – was bound to the consent of the German Army Command. The objective of the offensive also caused some difficulties.746 Conrad urged the cap- ture of Lviv, which seemed too ambitious to Falkenhayn, especially since he did not believe there could be an ultimate decision in Russia. Thus, with the liberation of cen- tral Galicia, namely the territory as far as the San River, they set themselves a relatively modest aim. Since for political reasons particular importance was attached to a swift victory, Falkenhayn did not even await the arrival of the last German corps, the X Army Corps, and other pieces of artillery, but instead allowed the offensive to already begin on 2 May 1915. It was felt that 107,000 soldiers, 604 guns and 70 mortars in the area of the breakthrough would ultimately suffice.747 Again, as so often in this war, the setting of a date was influenced by factors other than exclusively military ones. As in the Balkans in August 1914, it was intended that the strike be made as soon as possible because Romania, if not also Italy, should be kept in check. Again, as in the case of the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Russia at the end of August 1914, the intention was to pre-empt the Russians and under no circum- stances wait until the latter had regained their full strike capability. The German 11th Army, together with the Imperial and Royal VI Corps, encoun- tered at the beginning of the attack a weak point on the Russian front. It was not just the Russian weakness that could be exploited, however ; the German corps also brought