Page - 363 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me 363 participation in the war, in order to end the war as soon as possible. The majority of his party was appalled and resolved upon a manifesto in which the will to neutrality was emphasised. Mussolini submitted his resignation as the editor of Avanti.845 Italy’s attitude of course interested not only the countries of the Dual Alliance but at least as much the Entente states. Here matters also developed their own dynamic. From discussions held by the Italian ambassador in St. Petersburg, Marchese Andrea Carlotti, who had played a role in the July Crisis as an informant for the Russians, it became clear that in the event of a victory for the Entente, Russia was contemplating the cession of Trentino as well as other territories. The outcome of these negotiations was admittedly similar to that in Austria-Hungary a few weeks earlier, when Italy had been offered Nice and Corsica. Largely independently of this, France and Great Britain developed their own pro- posals, which also involved Trentino, as well as Vlorë in Albania. The British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey went a step further and wanted to see Trieste added. Thus, the catchphrase ‘Trento e Trieste’ was born. The Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov apparently did not want to be left out and offered Italy the acquisition of Dalmatia, adding that this was dependent on the agreement of Great Britain and France. Ger- many’s early military success in Belgium and France, likewise that of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and in Russia, did not initially allow the discussions between Italy and the Entente powers to really get going, since at this point in time everyone was unclear about the course of the war. However, events moved along at an extraordinary pace. First of all, however, a clar- ification process within the Italian government was necessary, and this commenced in mid-August : after Foreign Minister San Giuliano had addressed the possibility of Italy entering the war on the side of the Entente in a letter to the Italian Prime Minister Salandra from 9 August, the ground was tested. San Giuliano did not conceal from the Prime Minister his personal assessment of the consequences of such a step when he wrote : ‘We should make no pretence of the fact, however, that such a war […] would be regarded across Europe as an act of dishonesty […] even by those who might become our new allies.’846 Italy nonetheless began to sound out London, and indeed consciously here first of all, because both the discretion of the French and that of the Russians was doubted. However, Italy demanded the continuation of British coal deliveries even to com- mence discussions. San Giuliano requested in addition an immediate attack by British naval forces on the Austro-Hungarian Fleet formations in the Adriatic Sea. When this attack did not take place, San Giuliano interpreted this as a very good reason to main- tain Italian neutrality.847 He was absolutely aware that the security of Italy depended to a significant extent on the situation in the Mediterranean. As long as the Austro-Hun- garian Navy dominated the Adriatic, caution was advised.