Page - 387 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Third Front 387 Empire who were threatened, which was far more than a mass movement of those seeking revenge. In the Bohemian crown lands, Italy was also regarded as more of an enemy than Serbia and Russia, since the latter were after all Slavs. What tipped the balance for the southern Slavs was the fact that Italy had its sights on southern Slav territory extending far in the direction of Dalmatia. For Hungary, Italy was also an enemy that was judged on an emotional basis, although, certainly, it was not insig- nificant that Italy was regarded in the same light as Romania, and that by rejecting Italian demands, the intention was simultaneously to send signals to Romania. The unsuccessful attempt to at least keep Italy neutral was however regarded in Budapest, though with a certain degree of speciousness, as being a diplomatic failure. This could be seen as a sign of retrograde amnesia to the extent that in September 1914, there was a horrified reaction in Hungary when the idea was postulated in Germany that Suceava (Suczawa) and Rădăuţi (Radautz) be ceded to Romania in order to motivate it to enter the war. In fact, Tisza was indeed severely attacked by the Independence Party in parliament and accused of leaving parliament in the dark regarding developments relating to the Italian issue, as well as of failing to persuade the Austrians to relent. The leader of the Socialists, István Rakovszky, also became directly cynical and launched a blistering attack on Tisza and his policies. Tisza, he claimed, had already stated in 1914 that a punitive expedition with one single corps would be sufficient to bring down Serbia. And, here, he had been utterly wrong. Now, too, he was merely following the path of appeasement.916 However, it was difficult to take Tisza to task, since it was not possible to demand concessions from Austria with regard to Italy on the one hand, while on the other to ignore the wishes of Romania. The German lands of the Monarchy, however, felt themselves to be directly threat- ened, and reacted accordingly. The stereotypes were not hard to find. They were preva- lent in the meetings of the Joint Council of Ministers, in private records and particularly extensively in the exchange of letters between Conrad and the Military Chancellery. There, for example, Conrad wrote on 20 March 1915 : ‘Already as a brigadier in Tri- este, I pointed out the necessity of putting a stop to irredentism, and as a divisional commander in Innsbruck to the […], to increase the number of troops in South Tyrol, to build substantial fortifications  – as Chief [of the General Staff], I then urgently requested […] and this was the main issue, that the score with Italy be settled in good time, in other words, as early as 1907, at a point in time when there was nothing to fear from Serbia or Russia. […] The great Aehrenthal replied with arrogant haughtiness that : ‘in these times, one does not wage pre-emptive wars.’’ Then, on 10 May : ‘Whether or not it will now come to war with Italy or only to the cession of territories, it is still a sorry affair ; how different things would be if in 1907 we had crippled this perfidious neighbour for 20 years.’