Page - 426 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

426 Factory War and Domestic Front, 1915 been possible to cover the requirements of the front. The Imperial-Royal Ministry of National Defence ultimately calculated that after around two years of war, the relative figures yielded the following results : Austria Hungary Bosnia-Herzegovina Dead 57.15 per cent 40.24 per cent 2.61 per cent Wounded 55.84 per cent 41.42 per cent 2.74 per cent Prisoners 56.52 per cent 40.57 per cent 2.91 per cent Missing 59.89 per cent 38.03 per cent 2.08 per cent Who, then, had the higher proportional losses ? The Military Chancellery of the Em- peror argued furthermore that the Austrian half of the Empire had lost around 750,000 conscripts as a result of the Russian occupation of Galicia, so that the losses of the Austrian half of the Empire were disproportionately large ; this had in any case been recognised by the Hungarian government, however.1017 If a generally binding observation could be made about the situation on the do- mestic front after a year of the war, then it was that, at least in the economy, no signs of unrest had yet made themselves felt. Minor strikes had not been caused by a fun- damental dissatisfaction, whilst the unity of government and governed appeared to be thoroughly intact. Even the threatened detention periods of between six weeks and one year in the event of strikes in ‘state-protected’ enterprises did not have to be imposed.1018 The truce was endangered, however, where the Army High Command endeavoured to press ahead even further with the militarisation of the home front and to secure access rights for itself that definitely bore the imprint of a military dictatorship. The Army High Command began to intervene ever more strongly in domestic policy and ultimately had a direct share in the attempts to overthrow the government of Austrian Prime Minister Stürgkh. The Army High Command and Domestic Policy Since the Army High Command had established itself as the actual power centre and won enormous importance in all political questions, it had to be expected that the issue of the status of central authorities and Army High Command would intensify to the point that an inevitable confrontation would occur. The development did not occur gdually, but rather in bursts. And in the process, the factor already loomed that was subsequently called the ‘stab-in-the-back myth’ (Dolchstoßlegende) after the war. In an emergency situation such as war, the army leadership could only fulfil its tasks with the help of measures that were based on exceptional laws or ordinances. Since