Page - 449 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

On the Priority of the Theatres of War 449 necessitated a greater intensity of collaboration with the Imperial and Royal troops. Perhaps Falkenhayn was also tired of the constant disputes with the Eastern Front High Command of the German Army. Since he had moved to Pszczyna (Pleß), his relations with Hindenburg and Ludendorff had steadily worsened, and in the case of Ludendorff had already turned into unconcealed hatred.1070 The relationship between Falkenhayn and Conrad was considerably better. At least they showed a certain degree of restraint in their dealings with each other, and only permitted themselves to express their animosities freely in internal correspondence. Thus, Conrad wrote in one of his letters to the Military Chancellery of the Emperor after a visit to Pszczyna on 10 Au- gust, and following a three-hour conference with Falkenhayn : ‘This is surely one of my most difficult duties ; it entails unbounded self-control and self-deception ! I cannot describe what degree of anger I stifle ; but it cannot be otherwise for the good of our great joint purpose.’1071 For political reasons, aside from the memoirs, historical analyses during the in- ter-war period brushed aside the animosities between the alliance partners and played down their role. However, the personal records speak a very different language. And the files are even more unambiguous. The actual share of the Imperial and Royal Army High Command in the leadership during the great campaign in the east during 1915 was lower than can be surmised from the depiction in Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg (‘Austria-Hungary’s Final War’). Therefore, the termination of the collaboration in the summer of 1915 certainly had its logical aspects, and the dissolution was also imple- mented by both sides. Ultimately, it was also influenced by personal hostilities. The Army High Command had not overlooked the fact that new axes had been created, and that it was no longer of prime importance to keep an eye on the relationship with Mackensen or Ludendorff. The man who really mattered was Mackensen’s Chief of the Staff, General Hans von Seeckt, who had increasingly made direct contact with Falkenhayn and, in so doing, had bypassed both Mackensen and the Army High Com- mand. The target of German censure, aside from Conrad, who was the subject of only relatively moderate criticism, was the Commander of the Imperial and Royal 7th Army, General of Cavalry Baron Karl von Pflanzer-Baltin. Conrad was in principle in agreement with the decision to halt operations in the east, although he regarded the front on the Bug River, just 40 kilometres to the east of Lviv, as being too close in order to be certain that no new risk might arise for Aus- tro-Hungarian territory. The offensive was therefore to be continued with limited goals. In this way, he took the first step in making it clear that the Imperial and Royal troops wished to carry on with their attack towards the east and, if necessary, that they would do so alone, as they had already done in 1914. Even so, this had only become possible as a result of the joint successes that had been achieved in the Russian theatre of war. Conrad, however, was keen to emphasise the successes of the Austro-Hungarian troops