Page - 461 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Fourth Offensive against Serbia 461 at the latter’s request. ‘[…] in so doing, I shall also be in the position of presenting to his Sovereign Majesty the forthcoming action in the south-east, as well as briefly on the proceedings here in the north, in other words, on the serious crisis that we have, I hope, happily overcome. You can certainly imagine that on this matter, it was no easy task for me to again call for German help, but it weighs on me far more heavily that our war against Serbia, towards which all our traditions point and of which I dreamed in 1909, will from now on be led by the Germans. Yet this year has taught me to bear bitter disappointments ; and so this, too, must be accepted ; I hope that it will contribute to the success of our common purpose.’1101 Let us pick out a few words : ‘[…] our war against Serbia, towards which all our traditions point, […] will from now on be led by the Germans.’ Nothing could empha- sise the position of the Habsburg Monarchy, its armies and its military leaders more clearly than these words, dictated full of disappointment and bitterness. It looks almost the same as the vision created by Hugo Kerchnawe in 1908 in his book Unser letzter Kampf (‘Our Last Battle’) : once Austria-Hungary had spent its forces, it was overrun by Germany. The brotherhood in arms had become a competition. ‘Our’ war was being led by the Germans. In a higher sense, it had perhaps already become a German war long previously. There had been talk of a resumption of the offensive against Serbia since the spring of 1915, and already at that time, the Chief of the German General Staff had made it clear that he was prepared to send German troops to the south. To the Germans, Serbia had already appeared to be more important than Russia in the summer of 1915, a fact that was easy to explain. For Russia, there was no large-scale strategic goal, since there was hardly any sense in simply marching somewhere and continuing to fight. However, with the hoped-for overthrow of Serbia, a domino effect was supposed to be achieved : if Serbia fell, Romania and Bulgaria would also alter their position. Turkey could be effectively supported, and Montenegro could also be taken as a kind of additional prize. There would of necessity be consequences for Greece. In short, the entire Balkan region would take on a new form and change the way in which the war was fought. Falken- hayn might also have expected Austria-Hungary to be highly receptive of such ideas, since the Balkans were, after all, the Habsburgs’ ‘backyard’. Instead, Conrad showed at most polite interest in the concept of resuming the operations to overthrow Serbia. In his view, Italy was far more important. Yet Falkenhayn refused to let up, and already at the end of July 1915 he began with the specific preparations. Conrad had every reason, however, to at best agree cautiously to the German plans, since it was quite clearly not only Serbia that was at issue. And if Germany were to be successful in a campaign on the Danube, Sava and Morava Rivers, the Balkan region would definitively lose its status as the Habsburgs’ backyard, and everything that had been fought for against the Ottomans and the Russians would fall victim to the Germans. Accordingly, Conrad’s