Page - 509 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The ‘Punitive Expedition’ is Prepared 509 some cases, the snow cover could even make it impossible to extract troops who had already been deployed on the mountain front and who were now to be mustered and used elsewhere. With snow cover of between three and five metres, it was impossible for example to move around the ‘Kaiserjäger’ Imperial Rifles and Tyrolean standing infantry regiments, who had been dispersed over the front to form a type of corset. The troops became exposed to extreme danger, since they risked being buried alive every time they marched through slopes where avalanches were likely to occur  – and there were certainly enough of these in this region. Under these extreme weather conditions, bringing up troops, and above all war ma- terials, guns of all calibres, even the heaviest ones in the Monarchy, which now included not only the 30.5 cm mortars, but also a 35 cm cannon, as well as 38 cm and even 42 cm howitzers, demanded an exorbitant degree of effort and willingness to suffer hardships. For the deployment of the heavy offensive artillery on the plateaux of Folgaria and Lavarone, at heights of no less than 1,500 metres, only three roads were available for use. The one that was most at risk from avalanches was chosen for the transportation of the 42 cm coastal howitzer. Since this transport suffered from severe difficulties, the road was blocked for days for all other supply traffic. The cable cars only had a limited capacity, although from 20 March onwards, the most efficient of these, from Cagliano to Folgaria, achieved an impressive daily transport quota of 200 tons.1199 The first consequence of the weather-related difficulties was the use of the front troops, who were arriving by degrees, alongside the labour battalions in order to deal with the snow masses. As a result, an early date for the attack became illusory. The first deadline was put back. However, it was not possible to use the additional time in order to reconnoitre the terrain in front or to zero in the artillery on the enemy. All this would after all have given the deployment away and, in so doing, eliminated the ele- ment of operational surprise. Even so, the Italians were not unaware of the preparations for the attack. The delay in the offensive that resulted from the fact that the deadline was ultimately put back twice meant that the enemy troops were now made ready for defence  – something that they had not been before. Let us leave the more military issues relating to the deployment for the ‘punitive expedition’ to one side for now. There were also other particular features. It immediately becomes obvious that everything that was put into practice had been arranged from be- hind a desk. Plans were developed in Cieszyn, and it was in Cieszyn, too, that the orders were formulated that then led to the deployment in South Tyrol of an army group of two armies, the Imperial and Royal 11th (under Dankl) and the Imperial and Royal 3rd Army (under Kövess). From a distance of 800 kilometres and more, thoughts were dis- cussed and staffs bent over maps, whilst the overall troop distribution, but also many de- tails, the targets to be attacked and the entire logistical procedure were contrived. When the Chief of the General Staff of the Command of the South-Western Front, Major