Page - 525 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Brusilov Offensive 525 way troubled. They believed after the experiences of the Neujahrsschlacht (New Year’s Battle) that they could repel the Russians at any time, and showed no ambition to risk their lives in local thrusts. The war would be decided elsewhere  – if it had not already been decided. In any case, it had surely not been without effect that many of the best troops had been withdrawn for the South Tyrol offensive. Other divisions had been taken from the front for the purpose of ‘re-establishment’ and helped with the cultiva- tion of the fields in the spring.1228 At the front were few who had already been tested and all the more replacement troops from the last march battalions. And only few of these had been subjected to hard battle training, but instead engaged in drill and attempted, above all, to make their positions and the accommodation in the rear areas ‘liveable’. The numerical losses were offset and a total of around 800,000 soldiers and 16,000 officers sent to the eastern front. The departures came to just over 200,000 men and 4,000 officers. Thus, a healthy surplus remained.1229 The artillery was increased and was to have sufficient ammunition. There had certainly also been losses and not only through the withdrawal of very good troop bodies but also as a result of considerable portions of the heavy artillery having been transported to South Tyrol. Nonetheless, inspections of the front were to the full satisfaction of the commanders. According to a report of the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army, the troops were healthy and looked very good ; one could see the positive influence of the officers, the beneficial effect of the military surgeons and the senior commands. The positions had been outstandingly built and attempts were being made to improve them still further. Reports of inspections by German generals made for similar reading. The Russians had absolutely no chance with an offensive, not even ‘beginner’s luck’ would grant them a limited victory, as the Chief of Staff of Army Group Linsingen, Colonel Stoltzmann noted.1230 Four months, during which it had been possible to say ‘nothing new on the eastern front’, had created a misleading feeling of security. Even the increasingly frequent news of goings-on on the Russian side of the front could change nothing about the rather sedate view of ‘it won’t be that bad’. In mid-May, an analysis of the most recent Russian offensive reached the staffs of the Central Pow- ers : ‘Experiences from the Russian March Offensive of 1916 against the German 10th Army’. The bottom line was that it should be no problem to fend off a Russian offensive. The infantry was not to be feared, the officers generally hung around somewhere behind their formations, primarily making sure that their soldiers did not flee, and the soldiers at the front had no experience of war. Again, all warnings were thrown to the wind. Aerial intelligence reported time and again the preparations being made on the Russian side. In mid-May, the Russians had already dug five parallel trenches in order to bring their troops into their starting posi- tions ;1231 the increase in enemy artillery was obvious and statements from prisoners of war pointed towards an attack on a broad front. The Imperial and Royal Army High