Page - 548 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

548 Lutsk : The End of an Illusion (II) [sic] of our amount ! […] Krobatin himself remained amiable throughout, promising everything and smiling ! There is no seriousness ! No firm desire ! But they have to ! […] When I told them : ‘Your divisions perform badly, which is why your artillery must have an increased impact. The lack of human steadfastness must be replaced by machines. Our divisions have at least 10,000 rounds in reserve if they fire barely 1,000. This can- not continue’, etc., they pulled long faces, but they accepted it.’1289 Finally, the attention of those responsible for policy was demanded in a particular way by the events in Romania. In part, the situation as we know if from autumn 1914 and May 1915 repeated itself. The political and military leaderships were uncertain about the respective possibilities and demanded the impossible : the cession of Tran- sylvania on the one hand or, alternatively, a decisive blow to the Russians, which was designed to discourage the Romanians. Both of these options were impossible or not feasible. But not only in Austria-Hungary did confusion and the breakup of existing structures manifest themselves. This was also the case in the German Empire. Falken- hayn refused to believe in a forthcoming war with Romania, braced himself completely unreasonably against the Chancellor and Hindenburg, and finally regarded the radio messages that had been intercepted and decoded by Austria as incorrect or even falsi- fied by the Austrians. On 19 August, the Imperial and Royal High Command knew that Romania had not only signed a military convention with the Entente but had also begun to mobilise.1290 Even so, Falkenhayn repeated his accusations of forgery.1291 The Chief of the Great General Staff felt he had almost reached his objective in a matter that was for him essential. After the creation of the Hindenburg front, he had to give thought to how the position of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army could be consolidated vis-à-vis the Eastern Front High Command. He seized on the idea from 1915 of creating a joint war command of the Central Powers. He con- ferred with the Imperial Chancellor and with the Kaiser, and visualised for the latter that he, Kaiser Wilhelm II, practically already exercised this supreme command. Since signals came from the entourage of Emperor Franz Joseph, but also from that of Arch- duke Friedrich, to the effect that they found such a joint war command at least worthy of being discussed, only Conrad had to be ‘steamrollered’. It should be brought home to him that it was the desire of Turkey and Bulgaria that such a joint war command be created and that both Turkey and Bulgaria were prepared to subordinate their high commands and their troops.1292 Coincidence also helped a little. After he had visited the troops of the north-eastern front  – a rare event  – Conrad had also journeyed to visit the Isonzo. And it was precisely during this time that the German Plenipotentiary General attached to the Army High Command, Cramon, submitted to Archduke Frie- drich the written draft for the reorganisation of the chain of command. It was supposed to come into force three days later. The draft stated : ‘His Majesty the German Kaiser assumes from 25 August 1916, at 12 noon the unified command of the joint affairs