Page - 598 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

598 The Nameless by themselves that German generals occupy senior commands ; in this way, Mackensen, Marwitz, Linsingen, Gerok, [Kurt von] Morgen […], finally Hindenburg and now Falkenhayn moved in with us. I have no doubt that this all happens with system and purposeful intent  – unfortunately, it falls on fertile ground in German nationalist and Hungarian circles as well as with people who enjoy disparaging everything of their own  – as well as with those who lose heart in difficult situations and cling to a sup- posed knight in shining armour, as though in this monumental struggle, in which only the number and the quality of the troops is decisive, a single miracle could take effect. Germany has precisely these troops. If I have characterised these purposeful efforts of Ludendorff as raising Germany, so to speak, to [the status of] supreme state, to the leading power, then the conclusion is that the current German direction seeks a more or less far-reaching hegemony over the Monarchy ; to what extent this is done in a purely egotistical German interest or in the common interest, in the realisation that as a result we must also confront our enemies, especially Russia, is difficult to say  – that it follows its aim with Bismarckian ruthless- ness, however, is to be expected. And now to the consequences ! It is essential that we immediately become aware of our future relationship to Germany, [and] not seek to postpone this until after the war ; this relationship must be fixed by means of a binding state treaty ; mere pourparlers on this matter are worthless. The elucidation of our relationship to Germany must be preceded, however, by a regulation of our own house, namely the clarification of the re- lationship with Hungary and the political direction in Austria ; this is urgent and must be done with all energy. Positive results must be achieved, even under the imperative intervention of the army. If this does not happen, then it will hardly be a favourable horoscope that is cast for us and the grave sacrifices of this bloodiest of all wars will have been in vain.’ Conrad, who can certainly be accused of a great many things, but who was just as certainly not plagued by ‘senility’, as the German Plenipotentiary General August von Cramon claimed to have observed, was deeply pessimistic regarding the effects of the Joint Supreme War Command. And he saw his view of things confirmed when he learned of incidents that made clear the contempt of a growing throng of German policymakers. Cramon, for example, was generally reserved in his official comments, but in a smaller circle and towards his superiors in the German Empire he gave his unvarnished opinion. And it oozed insinuations and denigrating remarks : thanks to the Joint Supreme War Command, he claimed, the Imperial and Royal Army Com- mand was now only the ‘postman’. Conrad hardly ever emerged from his ‘foxhole’ or from the ‘arms of his lovely wife’. The Germans constantly had to run to the rescue of their Austrian fraternal allies, because the Germans would otherwise ‘have irretrievably lost’ the World War, and then this nation, which is ruled by ‘sloppiness’, does not even