Page - 612 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

612 The Death of the Old Emperor be able to hold his cabinet above water for long ; I consider him physically, morally and intellectually inadequate for this task, since he is already failing so miserably in forming the government.’1409 The overriding sentiment expressed in the note was mortification. Already on the day after his return from Budapest, Koerber reported the result of his discussions to the old Emperor. At this opportunity  – as Koerber later told Redlich on 8 December  – his intention had been to present the Emperor with a refusal of the mandate to form a government. ‘Then a scene occurred, sa[id] Koerber, which he will never forget all his life. The old Emperor half rose out of his chair, white as a sheet, his eyes bulging, raised his hands in entreaty towards him and cried with the voice of a man in torment : “Do you have no pity for me ?” Koerber was afraid that at any moment, the Emperor might die from a stroke !’1410 It is possible that these words really were spoken in this way. On All Saints’ Day, the process of forming the cabinet was completed. The new Austrian Prime Minister was without doubt one of the most eminent men of state. He had already been Prime Minister from 1900 to 1904, and had then led first the Austrian and finally, under Biliński, the Joint Finance Ministry. During Stürgkh’s period in office, he had come to the fore as an occasional severe critic of the Prime Minister. Now, he himself was the man who was in a position to set the course. For him, the most urgent problem was the issue of constitutionalism and the reconvening of the Reichsrat (Imperial Assembly). There was one thing that Koerber could not do, however, and that was to ignore the realities  – and there were many of these to take into consideration at the same time. The Prime Minister was unable to rule without the agreement of the Emperor, and Franz Joseph was against changing the policy that had been implemented to date, in other words, he was in principle in favour of the continued suspension of the Reichsrat. At the same time, however, Koerber could also not ignore the Army High Command, and had to incorporate what for the most part was an anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary attitude. Ultimately, Koerber was also unable to disregard the reality of the political parties and interest groups. And here, the German parties were naturally of particular significance. However, they could neither be persuaded to support a compromise of the nationalities, nor were they at that time ready to make peace.1411 For them, Germany and the peace with victory were para- mount. Christian Socialists and German nationalist representatives had agreed on 9 November 1916 to a joint resolution in which they demanded that the new Prime Minister immediately take in hand the ‘new order of affairs in Austria’. Here, however, their purpose was to achieve the goals of the German National League (Deutscher Na- tionalverband) that had been stipulated in the spring of 1916, but not to secure equal access to power for the nationalities in Austria, and certainly not their self-determi- nation. One of the moderate proponents of Central Europe, Richard Charmatz, who placed great hopes in Koerber, was of a different opinion. He knew him as a supporter of Naumann’s Central Europe plans, and welcomed him in the journal Hilfe with the