Page - 676 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

676 The Writing on the Wall the governments of the Entente powers to accept this fundamental principle.1539 The USA did not break off its relations with Austria-Hungary. However, this is probably less due to the fact that Czernin had been more amenable to the American proposals than Zimmermann, than that Austria-Hungary did not in fact wish to wage an unre- stricted submarine war any more so than Turkey and Bulgaria. What was of interest in Czernin’s note to the American Secretary of State was that the German government was only informed of it retrospectively. In light of the absence of a solidarity pact and despite mutual assurances to vouch for the territorial integrity of the empires, Berlin and Vienna had begun to go their own separate ways. However, while the German path brought a further escalation, and was possibly the step that led to the defeat of the Central Powers in the war, the Austrian leadership chose a different direction. And here, there was no doubt that the Emperor was leading the way. What Czernin had communicated to Secretary of State Lansing was nothing other than the basic tenet of the meeting of the Privy Council on 12 January 1917.1540 Under the chairmanship of Emperor Karl, the peace and war aims were discussed alongside the Polish question. Since the death of Franz Joseph, peace had most certainly been a subject of discussion. Two versions were addressed : a maximum and a minimum pro- gramme. For the latter, the Emperor only wanted to name Mount Lovćen, the massif to the south of the Bay of Kotor, as a territorial goal. Otherwise, however, efforts were to be made to preserve the integrity of the Monarchy and to bring about a dynastic change in Serbia. The others attending the meeting did not quite agree. With the ex- ception of Count Czernin, they argued for more ambitious aims and in fact did nothing other than discuss Minister Burián’s list. Then the Emperor again took the floor. The protocol of the Privy Council reads as follows : ‘It then so pleased His Majesty to raise the issue of an alliance with Russia, which his Supreme Highness describes as highly desirable, in particular with regard to the evident impossibility of making an approach to the western powers or to disloyal Italy. Russia should be offered a part of Romania, and Turkey would be amenable on the issue of the Turkish Straits.’ When the mini- mum and maximum programmes were again discussed, and the Chief of the General Staff, Field Marshal Conrad, was given the opportunity to speak, his response was blunt : it was pointless to establish such programmes, since it was not yet possible to say what could be achieved if peace were to be concluded. From a military perspective, a maximum programme would be permissible. When it came to Russia, Conrad’s tone was downright coarse and lecturing : ‘Russia is hardly likely to forfeit the two cardinal items of its foreign policy programme, namely the possession of Constantinople and the unification of all Slavs under its supremacy ; however, according to Count Ignatev’s statement, the road to Constantinople passes through Vienna and Budapest.’ Finally, the Emperor closed the debate in an extremely strange manner : ‘[…] that the status quo should be maintained with regard to the Polish question, that our main war aim is