Page - 699 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Fall of the Tsar 699 revolutionise their own front, the Eastern Front High Command ordered on 13 April the curtailment of hostilities.1589 The picture was still not the same everywhere. Some Russian troop formations con- tinued to behave in a hostile way, in spite of the restriction on combat operations man- dated by the Central Powers. The artillery did not cease firing everywhere, especially where French, British and  – as was claimed  – Japanese soldiers operated the guns.1590 This then led to Russian soldiers calling information across no-man’s-land. They an- nounced the identity of their troop bodies, shouted that they no longer wanted to shoot and had nothing in common with those who did not stop firing. If they were relieved, they would desert. There was raucous merriment and flags were waved repeatedly.1591 The Germans distributed spirits and the Austrians likewise rum. ‘The simple Russians thus associated peace with finally being able to booze.’1592 The reduction of the long- ing for peace to mere alcohol consumption had a straightforward reason : the Russian soldiers (though not the officers !) had been prohibited since the start of the war to drink alcohol. The ban could never really be forced through at the front, but it at least resulted in making it more difficult to gain access to liquor. In the case of the soldiers in the hinterland, as with the civilian population, the abstention campaign was designed to promote thrift, diligence and a readiness to make sacrifices  – and prevent rioting.1593 It simply could not yet be determined, however, whether and to what extent the Russian Revolution would have longer-term effects on the fighting capacity of the Russian Army. The German and Austro-Hungarian storm troopers along the entire eastern front were therefore commissioned with the task of clarifying matters by means of thrusts over the Russian lines.1594 It was not possible, however, to obtain an entirely accurate picture. There were merely selective insights. But the conclusion was that the opportunity should be seized ; therefore, the troops of the Central Powers attacked in some sections and were able to improve their positions without serious losses As soon as the senior commanders and, above all, the Army Command recognised that what had been called  – accurately and from the outset  – a ‘revolution’ was not an isolated phenomenon on a few sections of the front, political and strategic considera- tions won the upper hand. The German Supreme Army Command ultimately prohib- ited large-scale operations, since the prospect of a separate peace with Russia, which had suddenly become a concrete possibility, was not to be endangered. German and Austro-Hungarian troops were only to respond to attacks on the part of the Russians. What initially prevented an assessment of the revolution was the fact that it had not begun, for example, because the Russian Army had been on the verge of succumbing and then in view of a defeat, signs of disintegration and revolution had manifested themselves, as would later be the case, for example, in France and, ultimately, in Aus- tria-Hungary and Germany. The Russian armies had been relatively successful in 1916, with the exception of the setback they had suffered in Romania. During the winter, it