Page - 751 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The ‘Hand of the Child’ 751 tion, so that Karl, who was en route from Munich to Vienna at the time, decided on 2 July 1917, the name day of his son, Crown Prince Otto, to announce a far-reaching amnesty. The decisive passage in the imperial handwritten letter to the Prime Minister read : ‘I exempt those persons who have been convicted by a civilian or military court for one of the following punishable acts committed in civilian life from the punish- ment imposed : high treason […], lèse-majesté […], insulting members of the imperial family […], disturbance of the peace […], insurrection […], sedition […].’1746 Very few people had known of the Emperor’s intentions. The Foreign Minister and the other joint ministers, close advisors of the Emperor and the Army High Command had all been uninformed. After only a few days, it was general knowledge in Vienna that the resolution on the amnesty had been adopted behind the back of Czernin, who, as Foreign Minister, also fulfilled the role of Minister of the Imperial and Royal House- hold, and that he had therefore submitted his resignation. It was not accepted. Instead, Czernin was given the task of defending the amnesty, which could not have been easy for him. He argued that a ‘German peace’ was no longer achievable, and for this reason a negotiated peace was to be striven for. Great Britain, he continued, had provided an example of how all strengths could be pooled when it decreed an amnesty for all radical followers of the Irish independence movement, Sinn Féin. Furthermore, the military courts had ‘committed egregious injustices’. Emperor Karl’s recent reception in Munich had been so pointedly friendly because his inclination towards peace was well- known. Finally, Czernin added : ‘The Monarchy must be in order domestically before peace is made, otherwise the peace negotiations would also address our internal affairs and we would have a regulation dictated to us.’1747 But Czernin was evidently unable to convince. When Prime Minister Seidler read the Emperor’s letter on 3 July, there was uproar in the House of Representatives of the Reichsrat (Imperial Assembly). Then a storm blew up in the chamber. What Seidler then said was incomprehensible due to the noise. Things became physical.1748 Aside from, initially, the Czechs and the Social Democrats, the amnesty was met with the most strident rejection. Karel Kramář and around 1,000 Czechs were re- leased.1749 But no-one thought of even remotely acknowledging this step.1750 Whilst Seidler read the imperial volition in the House of Representatives, German Nationalist deputies called ‘Long live high treason !’ and ‘Kramář for Prime Minister !’ German Austrian circles saw the amnesty in general as confirmation ‘that their loyalty to the dy- nasty is repeatedly disappointed, [whilst] the subversive stance of the Slavs, by contrast, is rewarded’, as the Saxon envoy wrote.1751 What should have been an example and a special sign of reconciliation was understood merely as the unfortunate gesture of an inexperienced and frightened monarch. Now the Emperor himself was ridiculed (or had he done it himself ?), since some of the formulations in the amnesty decree could be maliciously extrapolated : ‘I select today […], on which my most dearly beloved, eldest