Page - 761 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

A German General on the Danube Monarchy 761 fighting on the wrong side. The response was the amnesty decree […] [ ;] the amnesty exempted the treasonous machinations from punishment. […] The prospect of a fur- ther accommodation of national desires is certain. […] From our point of view, one could again regard this development as an inner-Austrian one, if it did not stand in the direct context of foreign policy. An Austria with decisive Slav influence will be neither capable of an alliance nor willing to engage in one. This could also be left to future developments if the same anti-German elements were not urging a peace that they are prepared to sign any day at the expense of the German Empire.’ Seeckt then addressed conditions in Hungary. The raising of the question of suffrage and the toppling of Tisza had changed everything. The incorporation of supporters of Count Károlyi, who wanted to steer a strictly democratic course and was also prepared to sacrifice the Mag- yar hegemony, meant that the pro-German elements were being increasingly forced back. ‘The Crown demands the adoption of the amnesty in Hungary as well, which would mean here the immunity of the Romanian traitors and the suppression of the investigation being conducted against them. […] the danger also exists here in the calls for peace by the wearer of the crown and in the fact that he is inclined to accept things that are undesirable in pursuit of this aim.’ Károlyi was also able to say in the presence of Emperor Karl ‘that in his opinion Austria-Hungary is now only fighting for German interests and the sooner peace can and must be concluded, the better’. The central role naturally belonged to the Emperor and King. Seeckt, who had got to know Karl over a long period of time at close proximity and who, like his Chief of Staff, had by all means thought highly of him, revised his former assessment drastically : Karl, he claimed, was very easily influenced. Seeckt argued that he had underestimated how much Karl had been shaken in his self-confidence due to the frequent failure of the Imperial and Royal troops, but had developed from that a feeling of animosity towards Germany. ‘The big picture is so unclear to him, just as he overlooks the consequences of his measures. […] The following emotions are decisive for him at the present time : anxiety about a revolu- tion at home, concern for a military defeat, a yearning for peace.’ These aims could well win the upper hand over loyalty to the alliance. And then what would happen ? Seeckt did not know, either. He was just the messenger. Whilst it had looked in spring 1917 as though peace would come about after all, it became increasingly unlikely in summer 1917 that it would be possible to exit the war. In April, the formula of peace without annexations and contributions had been seized upon by the Social Democrats in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and informal contacts alone were by and large able to bring about a rapprochement. Since the Rus- sians had swung towards continuing the war, the Social Democrats saw themselves cheated of a mighty hope. But the threads otherwise knotted together in a very lasting way. Since the German imperial government had proved to be flexible regarding the demands of the Supreme Army Command and the Kaiser, in April 1917 the war aims