Page - 764 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

764 Kerensky Offensive and Peace Efforts But it was up to the western powers to make a decision on the continuation of the war. The Russians could no longer influence them. Following the defence against the Kerensky Offensive, the whole of East Galicia and Bukovina were once more in Austrian hands. For Austria, it was thus no longer necessary to make territorial concessions, although for a time the option had actually been contemplated of giving the Russians the eastern territories of the Danube Mon- archy in return for relinquishing Courland and Lithuania to the Germans. Haggling and discussions took place as though there were a lasting peace and one day, one week, one month more or less was irrelevant. Peace Feelers The impossibility of resuming political intercourse between the belligerents resulted from the diversity of interests. At the same time as the conclusion of a separate peace entered the realm of possibility in Russia and all attempts were to be made to achieve a general peace, developments within the western coalition led again to contrary tenden- cies. In France, there had been extensive mutinies after Joffre’s successor in the High Command, General Nivelle, had ordered reckless attacks against the German front in spring 1917. The mutinies were quelled and there were numerous death sentences. Niv- elle was substituted for General Pétain. Then, however, a wave of arrests took place in order to silence socialists and pacifists who had committed themselves to the formula of peace without annexations. In Great Britain, no let-up in the war effort was noticea- ble either. France and Great Britain had, however, had it in their hands for a short time to bring about a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. On 17 April 1917, a meeting had taken place with the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George at the urgent request of the French President Alexandre Ribot. The con- tents of a letter from Emperor Karl were discussed, which had been brought to the at- tention of the French government by Karl’s brother-in-law Sixtus Bourbon-Parma.1787 The French and the British were aware that a discernible offer of Austro-Hungarian concessions and a separate peace had to be discussed above all with Italy. But the Ital- ian Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino proved to be completely unamenable. Instead of exerting pressure on him, however, Ribot and Lloyd George contented themselves with an Italian ‘no’. The matter was to have consequences. After nothing had come of the separate peace, Lloyd George recommended a change of strategy : instead of striking the ‘strongest positions in the enemy armour’ with their swords, as they had been doing, the Allies were to attack the weakest. Instead of be- ginning a new offensive in Flanders, they were to transfer all available troops to Italy and drive Austria-Hungary from the field.1788 The British Premier had concluded from