Page - 780 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

780 The Pyrrhic Victory : The Breakthrough Battle of Flitsch-Tolmein June 1917, Wetzell again turned his attention to the Austro-Hungarian south-western front. The conclusions were similar to those of December 1916 : in northern France and Flanders, no long-term military success was in sight. In Italy, however, success might come more easily. The consequence would probably be that the British and French would have to withdraw troops from the German western front in order to hurry to Italy’s aid. And that would be the moment when the German troops deployed on the western front could go on the offensive in the northern sector. Aside from this, a joint offensive by German and Austro-Hungarian troops would prevent Emperor Karl from concluding a ‘lazy peace’. Ludendorff remained sceptical, but Wetzell did not give up. A success was needed to conclude the year 1917 well and to bring in a victory before the Americans could intervene on the side of the Allies. The best approach for an offensive in Italy would be an advance from Tyrol, although since it would not be possible to launch an attack there until late in the year, the Isonzo front would be a better option. Wetzell calculated that the force required would be twelve to fourteen German divi- sions, together with 500 heavy and 100 light pieces of artillery. He had therefore either adopted the ideas discussed within the Imperial and Royal Army High Command as his own, or had independently reached an identical conclusion. However, in Wetzell’s view, the formation of the focus would still have to be decided, although with a certain amount of luck, it would be possible to cross the Tagliamento River. It would be essen- tial to use a new gas weapon, known as mustard gas.1822 At the same time, the Army High Command in Baden was also taking up the ideas, which had by now become old, of an offensive against Italy. In a memorandum of 31 July 1917, the Army High Command summarised its deliberations, stating that an attack should not be attempted from the plateaus in the manner of the South Tyrol of- fensive of 1916, as Conrad von Hötzendorf had repeatedly demanded, but instead, that an offensive should be begun from the area of Bovec (Flitsch) and Tolmin (Tolmein). Linked to this was the issue of participation by German troops, and additionally, a common offensive of this nature depended on the agreement of the Joint Supreme War Command, in other words, it was ultimately dependent on the German Kaiser. Now, the ideas began to intersect. However, General Ludendorff was dismissive of the Chief of the Operations Division of the Imperial and Royal Army High Command, General Waldstätten. Ludendorff wanted to crush Romania entirely and, to him, this was more important than anything else. Italy could wait. Then came the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo. The Austro-Hungarian front faltered and for the first time showed signs of an imminent collapse. The Italians had gained a large area of territory between Gorizia (Görz) and Tol- min, to some degree against new and inexperienced troops. A leadership crisis had then emerged within the Austro-Hungarian command, since the commander of the army group, General Boroević, had already ordered the withdrawal of the entire front.