Page - 801 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

War against the USA 801 blamed his own problems in having a huge influence on American public opinion primarily on memories of Kossuth and the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, which con- tinued to engender sympathies, as well as on the Catholic Church.1877 In Washington, however, the war theorists were also at odds with each other. At issue was the precipitation of a decision as to where American troops brought to Eu- rope should be deployed. There were some who were of the opinion that it could al- ready be seen in the writings of Napoleon that if it came to an operational standstill in a theatre of war, a new approach had to be sought, and this would most likely be found in the eastern Mediterranean. Others were vehemently opposed to the idea and brought the problem of the delivery of supplies into the argument. The establishment of supply lines to France was difficult enough, they claimed, without creating additional problems. Wilson agreed. This was no way to begin the war against Austria-Hungary, however.1878 Wilson also supported the view that while a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary would boost Italian morale, it would ultimately be only a symbolic act. The outcome must be decided in France, and against the main enemy. While still under the impression that the American President was refusing to de- clare war on Austria-Hungary, the first conference of the Allied Supreme War Council began on 29 November 1917 in Paris, which the Americans also attended. The allies they encountered there were concerned and in some cases almost desperate. The Italian Foreign Minister, Sonnino, who was only too aware how history would judge him were Italy to lose the war, a war into which it was not least he who had led the country, had lost all confidence. According to the records by Aldrovandi-Mares- cotti, Sonnino claimed on 29 November : ‘I no longer hope for Trieste. Italy will per- haps be dismembered.’ Ambassador Nitti took the same line : ‘Whatever might happen, we shall always be able to turn Italy into an industrial state.’ Sonnino replied : ‘It would no longer be worth living there.’1879 However, between 29 November and 4 December, Wilson changed his mind. As had already been the case in April 1917, when the declaration of war on the Ger- man Empire was imminent, he decided against long discussions within his government. When he began work on formulating his traditional message to Congress, which was to be read out on 4 December, he incorporated a recommendation to Congress to declare war on the allies of the German Empire, namely Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. Finally, he took into account the interventions made by American missionaries and American cultural institutions in Bulgaria and Turkey and again removed any mention of these countries from his message. However, it came somewhat as a surprise on 4 December 1917 when he said : ‘Ich empfehle daher […] Österreich-Ungarn den Krieg zu erklären. Österreich-Ungarn ist zur Zeit nicht Herr seiner selbst, sondern ganz einfach ein Vasall der deutschen Regierung.’1880 Congress was wild with enthusiasm. There were several voices, however, who claimed that war should have been declared