Page - 912 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

912 The June Battle in Veneto the Astico and Piave Rivers. Army Group Boroević was to support the offensive with the Isonzo Army and the 6th Army by advancing towards Treviso. Immediately upon learning that he was to lead the offensive, Conrad made it known what forces he would need : 30 ½ divisions, in other words around ten corps, and thus double the number of soldiers that his armies had possessed until that point. On 11 April, Conrad was called to the Army High Command in Baden. He made a sceptical impression, and did not believe that success would be possible. The Army High Command wanted to give him reinforcements, but by no means as many as he had demanded.2195 Where were the missing divisions to be found ? Conrad immediately knew the answer : they would have to be taken from the Isonzo armies. Furthermore, he wanted to conduct the offensive further in the west, between the Astico and Brenta Rivers, in the Asiago area. He pre- sented his plans in detail to the Emperor, Arz and the Chief of the Operations Division, General Waldstätten. No-one immediately wrote down the results of the discussion, there was no protocol, and gung ho, alternative, transverse and counter plans then be- gan to be cheerfully made across the board. Arz and Waldstätten continued to support the idea of focussing the attack further eastwards between the Astico and Piave Rivers. During the discussion, however, the Emperor had agreed to Conrad’s ides. However, scarcely had Conrad returned to Trento (Trient) when Arz and Waldstätten began to change the Emperor’s mind and win him round to their ideas. It was a familiar, yet unsatisfactory game : whoever presented the Emperor with one idea and knew how to defend it would find that Karl was in agreement  – but only until the next person came. The conference in Baden was held at the height of the Sixtus Affair. Emperor Karl was confronted with the possibility of abdication and a regency, and now Conrad came with his idea of conducting the offensive somewhat further westwards, and Arz, who wanted to lead it further to the east. Despite his indisputable military experience, Karl was certainly not qualified to deal with issues relating to the leadership of major oper- ations. As soon as he had agreed to Conrad’s plan, he declined to involve himself with the situation overall. This was indeed the duty of Arz and the Chief of the Operations Division. However, both did not wish to abandon their plans, and began to under- mine Conrad’s concept by refusing to give him the troop reinforcements and supply goods that he needed. However, the Army High Command played an even stranger game : instead of deciding itself how the operation should be led, it outwardly sup- ported Conrad’s plan while at the same time letting it be known that a decision could not be taken regarding the distribution of forces until Army Group Boroević had also provided information on its requirements. Thus, the decision appeared to depend on what Boroević needed. When Waldstätten sought him out on 15 April in order to find out what he wanted, Boroević, from whom nothing else could be expected on the basis of his personality, did not demonstrate any kind of self-denial. He agreed with Conrad to the extent that he claimed that the offensive could only be led with one focal point.