Page - 918 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

918 The June Battle in Veneto The German Supreme Army Command increased the pressure on the Imperial and Royal Army High Command to finally begin the offensive. Now, a decision had to be made regarding the focus. A first indication was the distribution of the aerial forces. Conrad was assigned 50 fighter aeroplanes and 90 observation planes.2215 He promptly registered a complaint and said it was laughable to provide him with fewer aeroplanes for the main attack than Boroević. The Army High Command countered by claiming that in the mountains, the conditions fell far below the favourable condi- tions for deployment that existed in the lowlands. However, the position of the Army High Command only became clear at the beginning of May. Conrad was to continue to believe that he was to lead the main attack with his 11th Army (under General Count Scheuchenstuel) ; in reality, however, both army groups, that of Boroević and that of Conrad, were to conduct completely equal-ranking attack operations. This was a compromise solution that already condemned the offensive to failure right from the start. Both army groups were reinforced, the Isonzo armies somewhat more so than the armies under Conrad. Until the last, Arz and Waldstätten remained silent on their not intending to realise Conrad’s plan of attack and that they had placed the army reserve at the disposal of the Army High Command in such a manner that in practical terms, it would only be able to reach Army Group Boroević. Until the last day before the attack, objections were made and confusion reigned. Now, Conrad wanted to be ready for action by 15 June after all, while Boroević set a date of 25 June. The Army High Command decided to attack on the 15th. The commander of the XXIV Corps, Major General Ludwig Goiginger, expressed concern that the ridges of the Montello to the west of the Piave River would be left out, since from there, the Italians could observe and dominate the entire area of attack. Goiginger was then ordered to take the Montello, but for this operation, which in effect was likely to decide the entire outcome, he received no additional soldiers. On 13 June, Boroević reported that the weather was worsening by the day. In this weather, the deployment of gas would be useless in the lowlands and, furthermore, the Piave River was swelling continuously. He proposed postponing the attack by three days, but the agreed date of 15 June could not be changed, since in the interim, a diversionary attack by Conrad’s 10th Army (under Field Marshall Krobatin) had begun on the Tonale Pass and the troops of the Imperial and Royal 11th Army had already been installed in their initial positions. A retreat from the storm positions would have had catastrophic psychological consequences.2216 Furthermore, the Emperor had already arrived in the area of attack, and had moved into his headquarters in a special train in Schnalstal near Merano. He was accompa- nied by the Chief of the General Staff, General Arz, while the Chief of the Operations Division, Brigadier Waldstätten, had set up his headquarters in Belluno. The remainder of the Army High Command had been left in Baden.