Page - 920 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

920 The June Battle in Veneto complained about the slowness of the machines, particularly the ‘Hansa-Brandenburg C.I.’. The ‘Aviatik C.I.’, ‘Phoenix C.I.’ and ‘Ufag C.I.’ were regarded more highly, and were all single-engine reconnaissance and bomber aircraft. However, in reality, only the ‘Phoenix’ aeroplanes were by now suitable for use in the aerial war in Italy. Problems were also created by the machine guns, whose low rate of fire was a cause for concern, as well as poor ammunition and bombs that failed to explode. Flying had long since ceased to be an adventure, but instead presented a huge risk, for which there were too few pilots and too few ground crew. In general, the Austro-Hungarian leadership was concerned about the physical fa- tigue among the soldiers, as well as the state of their morale. Nationalistic slogans, the actions of their representatives abroad, as well as their own deputies in the Reichsrat (Imperial Assembly) and Reichstag (Imperial Diet) had had a significant effect, which was only increased by the use of legionaries. As had already been the case in Russia, in Italy, too, the Czech Imperial and Royal troops also faced troops from Czech legions, and while they may have been few in number, their existence was known. If a legionary was captured by the Austro-Hungarian side, he was executed on the spot by firing squad.2221 Finally, the returnees from the Russian prisoner of war camps only worsened the war fatigue. Incidents such as that in the march company of Infantry Regiment No. 25 were commonplace. During their transportation, soldiers fired indiscriminately from their moving train. A reserve battalion of Infantry Regiment No. 71 mutinied and could only be disciplined again with other troops using machine gun fire and ar- tillery.2222 However, it was neither correct nor justified to talk of Bolshevik sentiments, although the suspicions and disciplinary punishments caused the men to become recal- citrant and ultimately more renitent and radical than they had been before. During the nights leading up to the beginning of the offensive, it is estimated that hundreds of sol- diers deserted and informed the Italians. Aside from this, the Italians had also tapped the Austro-Hungarian field telephone lines close to the front, and were therefore up- to-date with developments.2223 As a result, the Allies no longer had to relocate troops at the last minute, since all preparations had already been made for defensive action. The knowledge of the hour of attack of ‘Operation Albrecht’ also enabled the Allies to clear the lines furthest to the front in good time, ensuring that the Austro-Hungarian artillery would fire into a void. The army groups at the Isonzo River and in Tyrol had been preparing for the offen- sive for weeks. Conrad dreamed of an advance on Veneto. Boroević wanted to reach Padua via Treviso. The main concern of the leadership, however, appeared to be ‘the exploitation of the conquered territory’, according to a summary given later by the General Staff major, Constantin Schneider. ‘The entire organisation revolved around this measure, which was dictated by concern that the booty would be seized. The pro- cedure for recording the food stocks found was regulated in log books’.2224 For all larger