Page - 959 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Judgement of Austria-Hungary’s Final Offensive 959 as the responses might be, Kemeter still wanted the greatest possible openness. Why was the first offensive that Austria-Hungary had led alone since May 1916 without success ? Was it correct that the ‘unanimous, selfless and thus uniform cooperation of the army leaders’ had been lacking, and that Field Marshal Baron Kövess and a series of other influential people from the military hierarchy had urgently advised against the offensive ? ‘Was it not a mistake to lead the offensive over the entire front, instead of conducting a massive, decisive blow at one or more particularly suitable points ?’ Had there been too little ammunition, had the aviation force really been inferior, why were Blue Cross and Yellow Cross chemical warfare agents not used, why had the medical services failed in the Trento (Trient) area, and how high were losses among officers, in particular among the higher ranks ? ‘Is there any recall of the superfluously mustered masses of people in the base areas and the hinterland, who were not used sensibly to provide the professional work so urgently needed for the army and the people in equal measure, for example railwaymen mustered in their thousands in the cadre of the rail- way regiment, who for many months have been withdrawn from any sensible activity that is appropriate to the purpose ?’ And, as a final item : ‘May earnest efforts be made to ensure that higher officers are also cautious with messages regarding preparations for military action.’2319 The interpellation response turned into a thick volume. Despite the demand for openness, the Army High Command failed to respond to a series of items, and others were only treated in very general terms, which resulted in the fact that the Minister of National Defence in the House of Representatives came out in a very good light, and the Army High Command in a bad one.2320 The memoranda written by the high commands involved in the Piave Offensive, which were gradually released, then presented the reasons of the failure in a far clearer and more detailed way than had been expressed in the materials given to the Austrian Reichsrat and the Hungarian Reichstag (Imperial Diet). Weak points, inadequacies and grotesque failure of duty had clearly been present everywhere.2321 An inspection visit by the former Army Supreme Commander, Archduke Friedrich, who had been sent by the Emperor to Italy and who had written records and reports, also provided an indication of several of the reasons.2322 Some things were so obvious that every soldier knew about them. The German Plenipotentiary General attached to the Army High Command, General Cramon, who himself had been a witness of the failure and who had sneered thoroughly at  – what he regarded as  – the haphazard travelling about behind the front on the part of the Emperor, received countless letters in which he was informed about incidents at and behind the front.2323 General Alois Count Schönburg-Hartenstein, who had commanded the IV Corps of the Isonzo Army during the June offensive, and who had then become Commander of the Imperial and Royal 6th Army, compiled a comprehensive manuscript that was designed to demonstrate to the Emperor with full openness and, indeed, in a directly aggressive manner, the catastrophic situation