Page - 547 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The ‘Joint Supreme War Command’ 547 zka from the Operations Division the Army High Command, since he eschewed the gathering of ministers and prime ministers. But the Joint Council of Ministers (which, incidentally, did not manifest itself in the regular minutes, because it was perhaps not regarded as a formal gathering)1285 demanded concrete information, and when it was not supplied ‘the ministers protested at being treated like journalists. Tisza declared that he would resign tomorrow if he did not actually receive the concrete information that he demanded.’1286 When Conrad was informed of this, he acted as though he were aggrieved. As his reasons for not supplying information, he cited alongside secrecy the inadmissibility of the interference of state functionaries in the conduct of war. Now the prime ministers and Burián stuck to their guns. They recognised that Conrad’s position was shaken, that the Emperor and, at least indirectly, also Archduke Friedrich no longer unreservedly covered for the Chief of the General Staff and would ultimately also drop him. Now the situation was reappraised. On 7 July, the Emperor decreed that the Foreign Minister be ‘kept continuously informed of the condition of the Army and the replacements and reinforcements to be supplied to it’.1287 On 13 July, at the next session of the Joint Council of Ministers, the Army High Command was again represented by Colonel Slameczka. The minis- ters acknowledged with satisfaction the willingness of the Army High Command to increasingly request assistance from German troops. The use of Ottoman troops was admittedly met with some concern, but in order to stabilise the Carpathian front and to keep the Russians away from Hungary, the Turks were also acceptable. Scarcely was the Ministerial Council over when the Ballhausplatz (Austro-Hungarian Imperial Chan- cellery) began to appeal to Berlin regarding the Hindenburg front. And shortly after, once the front had become reality, the German Imperial Chancellor travelled to Vienna and noticed with satisfaction the badmouthing of the Army High Command. Burián, Tisza, Stürgkh and Montenuovo assured Bethmann-Hollweg that the expansion of Hindenburg’s area of command had brought with it a redemptive effect, and it was only regrettable that Hindenburg did not have the entire Eastern Front under him. Conrad’s misgivings were completely unfounded. As a result of his private circumstances, his private war with Italy, which the Emperor had only reluctantly agreed to and Archduke Eugen had urgently advised against, and his lack of personal contact to the front, Con- rad had forfeited all credit. This applied not just to Conrad, however, but to the whole ‘morass’ in Cieszyn.1288 All this was, at least in part, nonsense, but it sounded good. The next opportunity to strongly remind Vienna of its failures, mistakes and lack of willingness arose during the visit of the Prussian War Minister Wild von Hohenborn at the beginning of August. Wild claimed on this occasion to have really given War Minister Krobatin and the head of department in the War Ministry a piece of his mind : ‘The insights into the replacement conditions and the ammunition and equipment pro- duction were horrifying. Powder is the nervus rerum, and they produce at best 1/20