Page - 42 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

3. Change in quality and quantity of living beings depends on locomotion, but not vice versa 3.1 Overview Aristotle presents his first argument for the priority of locomotion in the following lines: τριῶν δ᾽ οὐσῶν κινήσεων, τῆς τε κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ τῆς κατὰ πάθος καὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον, ἥν καλοῦμεν φοράν, ταύτην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρώτην. ἀδύνατον γὰρ αὔξησιν εἶναι ἀλλοιώσεως μὴ προϋ- παρχούσης· τὸ γὰρ αὐξανόμενον ἔστιν μὲν ὡς ὁμοίῳ αὐξάνεται, ἔστιν δ᾽ ὡς ἀνομοίῳ· τροφὴ γὰρ λέγεται τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον. προσγίγνεται δὲ πᾶν γιγνόμενον ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ. ἀνάγκη οὖν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναι τὴν εἰς τἀναντία μεταβολήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ἀλλοιοῦται, δεῖ τι εἶναι τὸ ἀλλοιοῦν καὶ ποιοῦν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει θερμοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ θερμόν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ κινοῦν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ᾽ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐγγύτερον ὁτὲ δὲ πορρώτερον τοῦ ἀλλοιουμένου ἐστίν. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἄνευ φορᾶς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν. (260a26–b7) As there are three kinds of non-substantial change, that with respect to magnitude, that with respect to quality, and that with respect to place, which we call locomotion, this [last] one must be primary. For it is impossible that there is growth without a preceding alteration. For what grows in one way grows by what is like, but in another way by what is unlike. For the contrary is said to be food for the contrary. But everything is added to its like by becoming alike. Therefore, the change between the contraries must be an alteration. Surely, if something is altered, there needs to be something that alters the thing and which makes it [change] from potentially hot to actually hot. So, it is clear that the mover does not [always] hold the same relation [to what is altered], but sometimes is nearer and sometimes farther away from what is altered. But this cannot be without locomotion. According to my reading, Aristotle in this argument is showing that loco- motion in a certain respect has ontological priority over the other two kinds of non-substantial change, i.e. change in quantity and quality. As we will see, something x is ontologically prior to y, if and only if for y to be there must be x, but not vice versa. Or, to put it in other words, y cannot be with- ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen