Page - 148 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

6.3 Objection: Locomotion is the last of all changes in perishable things If this were all there is to say about locomotion’s temporal priority, then Aristotle could have stopped after the first two lines of the passage, yet, his discussion of this fact will continue for fifteen more lines.11 Clearly, then, Aristotle thinks that there are more things that need to be said with respect to the claim that locomotion is prior in time to the other kinds. The motiva- tion for continuing this discussion, as we will see now, is an objection that may be raised against the assumption of the general temporal priority of locomotion. According to my reading the passage therefore is not primarily about explaining in what way locomotion is prior with respect to time; for as we have just seen, this follows more or less directly from what was stated in the previous argument, which is also the reason why Aristotle discusses this claim only in the first two lines of the passage and does also not really give a detailed presentation of the argument for it there as well. The whole passage accordingly should be read as being primarily about dealing with a possible objection against the claim of locomotion’s temporal priority and how that claim may be reconciled with Aristotle’s theory of there being a first unmoved mover that is responsible for all other changes that occur.12 For, right after the remarks on locomotion being the only type of change eternal things can undergo, a fact is presented that might contradict the claim of locomotion’s temporal primacy or that is at least difficult to fit into Aristotle’s theory. This fact is that in things which in contrast to eternal things have a coming to be (τὰ ἔχοντα γένεσιν) (and that perish again later on) locomotion is not primary at all, but quite the contrary even seems to be the last of the different types of change (ὑστάτην τῶν κινήσεων).13 For with respect to each such thing, Aristotle tells us, the sequence of changes is this: after the process of its coming to be is set in motion, the first changes to occur are alteration and change in quantity, namely growth, while locomotion comes to the thing at a rather late stage in its develop- ment, but—and this is crucial here—certainly at a later point than the other three kinds of change.14 11 In fact, this passage is the longest of the five passages in which the five arguments for locomotion’s priority are presented. 12 This is the reason why I take it that Aristotle’s long discussion of locomotion’s tem- poral priority is a necessary part of the discussion of the primacy of locomotion and not, as Graham (1999), 127, asserts a superfluous addition which indicates Aristotle’s “propensity for philosophical overkill.” Yet, as I said, Aristotle here most of all focuses on showing that a ser- ious objection to his thesis is not a problem, but fits quite well into his larger theory. 13 See Phys. VIII 7, 260b30–32. 14 μετὰ γὰρ τὸ γενέσθαι πρῶτον ἀλλοίωσις καὶ αὔξησις, φορὰ δ᾽ ἤδη τετελειωμέ- 148 Locomotion has temporal priority ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen