Page - 53 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

As it is clear now that alteration indeed presupposes that locomotion pre- cedes it in the sense stated above, it is also clear that the same is true for the cases of growth and diminution discussed here. For, as we have seen, these changes in quantity cannot come about without an alteration that occurs before the actual growth or diminution. Therefore, we can conclude that change in magnitude and quality in this way presuppose locomotion. This, however, Aristotle thinks, shows that of the three non-substantial kinds of change, change in place must be the primary one. 3.4 Does locomotion precede all occurrences of change in quantity? As we have seen, Aristotle’s argument indeed seems to show that for there to be alteration, i.e. change in quality, as well as growth and diminution, that is, change in magnitude, some kind of change in place has to be pre- supposed. But we need to be clear about how to understand this: as we have seen this does not necessarily mean that the subject of the change in quality or quantity changes in place, but merely that something which may or may not be identical with the subject of these changes needs to undergo a change with respect to place in order for growth, diminution, or alteration to occur. To put it more generally, this means that where there is any change in qual- ity or quantity of x, there must also be a change in place of some y, although y does not have to be identical with x. This, Aristotle appears to think, makes clear that of the three kinds of non-substantial change, namely of change with respect to magnitude (κατὰ μέγεθος), to quality (κατὰ πάθος), and to place (κατὰ τόπον), the one that we call locomotion is primary.36 But as I will now show there is a rea- son to think that only a rather more limited claim follows from the argu- ment, and that Aristotle, therefore, might not succeed in showing what he is supposed to show. The reason is that Aristotle appears to claim that locomotion is prior to any change that occurs with respect to the subject’s magnitude in general, whereas this argument only seems to show this to be true with respect to special cases of this kind of change, namely growth and diminution as they occur in living organisms, since this is clearly indicated by the way in which growth is explained in Phys. VIII 7.37 This criticism appears to be justified, 36 τριῶν δ᾽ οὐσῶν κινήσεων, τῆς τε κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ τῆς κατὰ πάθος καὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον, ἥν καλοῦμεν φοράν, ταύτην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρώτην. Phys. VIII 7, 260a26–31. 37 For this criticism see Wagner (1967), 688 and 691. It is clear that Simplicius, In Phys. 8, 1265, 26–28, thinks that Aristotle is not speaking about change in magnitude here in general, Does locomotion precede all occurrences of change in quantity? 53 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen