Page - 179 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

received this sensory input, initiates the bodily reaction.38 However, this does not imply that the alteration is caused by the sensory part of the soul alone; as there must be nourishment that the nutritive soul can transform into a part of the body in order for the body to grow, there also needs to be some sensory input for the alteration to take place; nevertheless it is the nutritive soul that is responsible for the occurrence of the growth in the first place, as is the sensory part for the respective alteration.39 The fact that such alterations are caused by the sensory capacity, of course, does not mean that this capacity of the soul is the primary source of all changes in quality a liv- ing being undergoes. Only those alterations for which the animal itself is responsible in the aforementioned way are caused by the soul’s sensory capacity. My soul is not responsible for the warming of my skin that occurs when I take a sunbath, but it is for the darkening of my skin. The passage from PA I 1 does not name the part that is the origin of loco- motion and that, according to the De Anima, one may call the locomotive part (κινητικόν). But it says that this part is different from the nutritive, the sensory, and the rational part of the soul40, which makes clear, again, that for locomotion, too, there is a specific part or capacity in the soul that is responsible for this kind of change. For my purposes, that is for under- standing Aristotle’s argument for the claim that locomotion has priority in essence, this is sufficient. 7.1.4.2 Priority in essence of the locomotive capacity To sum up what I just said: for each of the three kinds of non-substantial change that a living being undergoes and for which it is responsible in the sense that they originate in the animal’s soul, there is a specific capacity or part of the soul that is responsible for it. In this group of capacities, as Aris- totle claims, the one for locomotion is primary. According to what Aristotle says in the De Anima and elsewhere, these different capacities or parts of the soul stand in a relation of dependency. 38 This is a modified version of an example Balme (1992), 92, uses. 39 Another, more complex example would be the case in which I feel I have been treated unjustly and in reaction become angry so that, among other things, my face turns hot and red. That such cases count as alterations may be seen in Aristotle’s discussion of shame in EN IV 9. Shame, Aristotle tells us, is “more like a passion than a state” (πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον), since “people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death turn pale”, which shows that both “seem to be in a sense bodily conditions” (σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεται πως εἶναι) (EN IV 9, 1128b10–15, Transl. Ross). Thus when I blush, Balme (1992), 92, argues, my “memory or expectation of certain pains or pleasures” cause the sensory part of my soul to make my cheeks become hot and red. 40 φορᾶς δ᾽ ἕτερόντι καὶ οὐ τὸ νοητικόν, PA I 1, 641b7. Locomotion is prior in essence, since it is last in coming to be 179 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen