Page - 12 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

the primacy of locomotion in the Physics is part of Aristotle’s larger project of developing a general theory of the phenomenon of change. More specifi- cally, by belonging to Book VIII of this work, the discussion fulfils the essential task of providing justification for a claim whose truth is presup- posed by the whole theory developed in Phys. VIII, a claim which, however, is far from obvious. A part of this important task, I will argue, is carried out by Aristotle, who shows that locomotion is the primary kind of change in different respects, and that therefore the eternal change which is directly caused by the first unmoved mover can only be locomotion. In the five chapters following this preparatory work I will present a detailed, step-by-step analysis of each of the five different arguments pre- sented for the priority claim in Phys. VIII 7. My examination of the differ- ent arguments will follow their order of appearance in VIII 7. The first three of these arguments, I will claim, show that locomotion is ontologically prior to the other kinds of change in different respects, while the fourth and fifth make clear that it is also prior in time and in essence, respectively. As we will see, most of these arguments are rather compressed, but at the same time presuppose the reader’s acquaintance with the larger theoretical back- ground sketched out for instance in the De Anima, the De Generatione et Corruptione, as well as in other parts of the Physics. Consequently, under- standing and evaluating the five arguments often involves discussing rele- vant points of these theories. I shall start by discussing the first of these arguments (260a26–7b). In this argument Aristotle, as I will argue, shows that locomotion has ontological priority in that change in quality and quantity occurring in living beings depends on change in place, because both always presuppose the occur- rence of a preceding locomotion, but not vice versa (chapter 3). In the next step I will examine the second argument (260b7–15), which presents another way in which locomotion has ontological priority, namely in virtue of the fact that locomotion always accompanies every other kind of change, while the converse does not hold. For, as I will show, undergoing any of the three remaining kinds of change implies that parts of the respec- tive subject change in place (chapter 4). This will be followed by my analysis of the third argument (260b15–29), which discusses the third way in which locomotion is ontologically prior. According to this argument locomotion is ontologically prior, I will claim, because it is the only type of change that in principle can be eternal and therefore at least in this respect seems to be the only possible candidate for the eternal change responsible for the occurrence of the other types, while itself not presupposing the occurrence of some other change (chapter 5). Next, I will present my reading of the fourth argument (260b29–a12). I will argue that Aristotle, by once again making use of the fact that in princi- ple locomotion alone can be eternal, makes clear that it also has temporal 12 Introduction ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen