Page - 23 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

argued in his commentary on De Caelo that this was the right way of divid- ing the Physics.32 But there appears to be a problem with this division. It looks as though it is compatible with all the statements about the arrangement of the books that were presented by Simplicius in order to support his and Andronicus’ view; all but one: as we have seen, Damas reports that according to Eude- mus the treatise On Change consists of three books. Dividing the Physics after Book IV however, would imply that the work On Change consists of Books V–VIII, i.e. of four rather than three books. Yet, there is another statement by Eudemus which tells us something about the structure of our Physics. Eudemus who, as already mentioned, was a direct disciple of Aris- totle, did not consider Book VII to be a genuine part of the Physics.33 Ancient commentators and modern scholars, too, for several reasons take Book VII to be a later misplacement of either a formerly independent trea- tise, an earlier version of Book VIII, or some collection of notes on the topic of change.34 However, it is correct to say that Book VII is related in a cer- tain way to Book VIII35 and, as it deals with change in general, rather belongs to the part of the Physics which was called On Change than On Nat- ure. The mere fact that it is related to Phys. VIII in content, however, implies neither that Aristotle himself considered it to be a necessary part of the treatise On Change, nor that he intended to place it between Book VI and VIII. For, as I will show, Book VII interrupts the line of thought that connects VI and VIII and therefore certainly was not a part of the treatise On Change, although the points discussed in Book VII clearly are closely connected to those dealt with in the On Change.36 This then lead Simplicius 32 See In Cael. 1, 226, 19–23, where Simplicius claims that Aristotle called the first four books On Principles and the remaining four On Change (περὶ ἀρχῶν τὰ τέσσαρα πρῶτα βιβλία τὴς Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως, ὥσπερ τὰ λοιπὰ τέσσαρα περὶ κινήσεως). 33 See Simplicius In Phys. 7, 1036, 11–15. See also Jaeger (1955), 312, Brunschwig (1991), 27, and Barnes (1997), 61. 34 According to Simplicius, who himself holds that VII does not fit in its context, Alexan- der, Eudemus, and Themistius also seem to have thought this way (In Phys. 7, 1036, 8–17) (and, indeed, Themistius’ paraphrasis of Phys. VII is rather short in comparison to that of the other books). See also Ross (1936), 15–17, Mansion (1946), 14–15, Jaeger (1955), 312, Wagner (1967), 275, and Brunschwig (1991), 27, 31, for the claim that Physics VII must be a misplace- ment. 35 See Waterlow (1982), 236, n.22, and Wardy (1990), 114–116, who argue that Physics VII provides support for an assumption on which the theory developed in Phys. VIII 1–6 relies. One could further add that VII 2 is the only place where Aristotle systematically dis- cusses the claim that the non-substantial kinds of change presuppose that the changer and the subject of the change come into contact, an assumption clearly presupposed by the first of the five arguments for the priority claim (see section 3.3, esp. p.50–51). 36 For instance Book VI ends with the remark that it remains to be shown that there is The arrangement of the Physics 23 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen