Page - 72 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

kinds of change.1 Yet, it is important to emphasize that attributing to loco- motion this kind of priority, contrary to what has been stated in the litera- ture, in no way implies that any other kind of change can be reduced to locomotion. In order to show all this, I will argue, Aristotle focuses on the processes that occur on (what one might call) the material level when each of the dif- ferent types of change takes place. In this way Aristotle demonstrates that locomotion is the primary kind of change, as it is an ineliminable part of every other kind of change, but at the same time he does not argue that the remaining kinds of change are reducible to locomotion, since change in place is not the only explanatory factor needed to understand all of the dif- ferent types. Accordingly, he rejects an assumption held by some of his pre- decessors that processes like aggregation and segregation (σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις) are more important than and prior to locomotion in the sense that they are responsible for every change that occurs in the cosmos. The passage at first glance seems to be problematic to the reader of Aris- totle, as certain assumptions made here appear to clearly contradict basic premises of Aristotle’s philosophy and a non-Aristotelian terminology seems to be employed. Because of this it was argued that in these lines Aris- totle is not presenting his own theory, but rather is arguing from his prede- cessors’ point of view.2 However, I will present reasons that strongly suggest that this argument needs to be read as Aristotle’s own. As I see it, the argument consists of three sub-arguments.3 The first shows that what undergoes a change in quality (alteration) needs to change in place. The second argues that the same is true for the subject of a sub- stantial change (generation and corruption), and the third that the subject of change in quantity (growth and diminution) also necessarily changes with respect to place. I will now present a detailed examination of each of these three arguments. I will proceed in inverse order, starting with the last one on the relation between change in quantity and locomotion (4.2), fol- 1 As we have seen in my discussion in section 3.6, x is ontologically prior to y, if and only if for there to be y there also must be x, but not vice versa. 2 See for instance Philoponus, In Phys. 8, 896. Aquinas, In Phys., L. VIII, l.XIV, 1089, thinks that most of this argument is based on the probable assumptions of earlier philoso- phers (“secundum quod erat probabile ex opinione aliorum philosophorum”). See also Wagner (1967), 688, and Graham (1999), 122–123. Zekl (1988), 289, n.114, at least takes 260b7–12 not to be stating an Aristotelian view. On the other hand, Themistius, In Phys. 8, 225, 26–226, 7, Simplicius, In Phys. 8, 1266, 10–1267, 28, as well as Ross (1936), 709, Cleary (1988), 81, and Morison (2002), 14–15, basically seem to take the argument to present Aristo- tle’s own view. 3 Accordingly, I do not agree with Graham (1999), 187, who takes Aristotle to present one single argument for the claim that locomotion is prior to change in affections, as his reconstruction of the argument in the appendix shows. 72 Locomotion necessarily accompanies each of the other kinds of change ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen