Page - 91 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

(some of) his predecessors’ point of view here in this argument in VIII 7, perhaps in order to, as Graham thinks, “demonstrate that even advocates of alternative natural philosophies must grant this point”40, namely that change in place is the primary kind of change. According to this interpreta- tion the passage shows that even if one starts from the mistaken assump- tions of Aristotle’s predecessors, one is forced to conclude that locomotion is primary. In this way, those who hold these mistaken views are shown that this indeed is what follows from their assumptions; the argument is success- ful because it is persuasive. However, the passage thus interpreted would not contribute anything to the fundamental argument of Phys. VIII 7, the goal of which is to show that locomotion really—not merely based on erro- neous assumptions—is the only possible candidate for being the kind of change that has its primary and direct source in the first unmoved mover. Thus, if there is a way in which this argument may be read as a serious argument for the priority claim, then this reading should be preferred over the orthodox one. I will argue that this is possible. In my understanding Aristotle adopts Presocratic terminology to a certain degree in order to show that the subject of a substantial change always undergoes change in place with respect to its basic material components and that locomotion is the primary kind of change. The only way to see whether my interpretation is correct is to examine the relation that according to Aristotle exists between generation and cor- ruption and the two phenomena called aggregation and segregation. The place where Aristotle discusses this relation in more detail is GC I 2. What Aristotle states here seems indeed at first glance to support the claim that the second argument does not present Aristotle’s own view and also was taken that way.41 For, in this chapter it is argued that change in substance, i.e. unqualified generation and corruption42, for a number of reasons can- not be aggregation and segregation. Thus, substantial change cannot be respect to the passage in question thinks that Aristotle here “merely performs a courtesy bow to the opinio communis […] but does not accept this opinion.” Also Wagner (1967), 688, Zekl (1988), 289, n.114, and Graham (1999), 122–123, reject that this argument presents Aristo- tle’s own assumptions and arguments. Simplicius, In Phys. 8, 1266, 10–1267, 28, as well as Ross, seem to take the passage as presenting a genuine Aristotelian view (or at least do not state any doubts about this) and Ross, 709, reads it as “an incidental reminder that σύγκρισις and διάκρισις, which obviously involve φορά, lie at the basis of γένεσις and φθορά, as well as of ἀλλοίωσις.” Morison (2002), 14–15 also takes the passage as stating Aristotle’s own assumptions and argument. 40 Graham (1999), 123. 41 See Graham (1999), 123. 42 See GC I 3, 317b1–13. For Aristotle’s understanding of unqualified generation and cor- ruption see also Phys. V1, 225a12–20. What undergoes generation or corruption changes with respect to place 91 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen