Page - 99 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

I will argue that this argument aims at showing that locomotion is prior to change in quality, in the sense that whenever something undergoes a change in quality, i.e. an alteration, this change must always be accompa- nied by a change in place, but not vice versa. Accordingly, no alteration can occur without locomotion, while the converse does not hold. This argument therefore shows that change in place has ontological priority over change in quality. In this way the argument fits perfectly in the larger context of the second argument for the priority of locomotion as a whole, since in the two other sub-arguments it was shown that change in place is ontologically prior to the other two types of change, i.e. in quantity as well as in substance, since both are necessarily accompanied by change in place, too, while the occurrence of locomotion does not depend on any other type of change. Hence, if the last of the three sub-arguments presented here is correct, then locomotion is necessarily concomitant to all other changes, but not the other way round, and thus is ontologically prior to each of the other three kinds of change. In my discussion I will proceed as follows. I will start by asking what exactly Aristotle means by claiming that condensation and rarefaction are a source of all qualities and change in qualities. Against the background of Phys. IV 9 I will argue that Aristotle thinks that for something to have any kind of quality it must have a certain state of density and that thus any change in quality must involve some change in density (4.4.2). After that I will present Aristotle’s reason for making this claim: firstly, I will show that for Aristotle every alteration involves a change with respect to the four basic qualities of hot-cold and dry-moist (4.4.3). Next, I will explain that any change with respect to these four basic qualities goes hand in hand with a change in density, i.e. condensation or rarefaction, and that for this reason every alteration is accompanied by a corresponding change in density (4.4.4). After that, by making use of the way in which the terms condensa- tion and rarefaction and of aggregation and segregation are employed by Aristotle, I will show that Aristotle is correct in holding the view that the former are instances of the latter (4.4.5). Since it is clear from the previous discussion that aggregation and segregation necessarily go hand in hand with locomotion, I will conclude by arguing that this is also the case for condensation and rarefaction, which shows the ontological priority of loco- motion over alteration (4.4.6). I will end by summarizing the results of my examination (4.4.7). As in the case of the argument discussed in the previous section, serious doubts have been uttered as to whether the claim made here about altera- tion represents Aristotle’s own view. In the course of my inquiry I will therefore also discuss reasons for thinking that this is not a serious Aristote- lian claim. I will argue that this part of the second argument—like the other parts—may be read as representing Aristotle’s own theory. What changes in quality changes with respect to place 99 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen