Page - 103 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

But so far it has only become clear that this is the basic idea behind the claim in question, and that there is no reason to doubt that this is Aristotle’s own view. We have yet to examine whether he is right in claiming that con- densation and rarefaction are sources of quality and change in quality. For, thus far I have only shown that this is true for two of the three examples presented in Phys. VIII 7, namely for the two opposite pairs of heavy-light and hard-soft. But although the qualities of hot (θερμόν) and cold (ψυχρόν) are mentioned in the course of the discussion in Phys. IV 9, a connection between these qualities and states of rarity and density is not established there. Even if this were clear, however, how would it show that all change in quality, and not only with respect to the three mentioned pairs of qualitative opposites, is connected with a change in the respective thing’s density? For, Aristotle claims in the second argument for the priority of locomotion that condensation and rarefaction are a source of all affections (πάντων τῶν παθημάτων)82, which in this context also includes all other kinds of qualities as well, because for Aristotle not only changes in the aforementioned qualities, but also in colour, taste, or from health to sick- ness, from uneducated to educated, or from a round to an angular shape count as change in quality, i.e. as alteration.83 Apart from this, one needs to keep in mind that the goal of this argument is to show that locomotion is prior to alteration in general and not only with respect to certain kinds of change in quality. As I will now argue, the solution is to understand that Aristotle here is focusing—as he did with the other two sub-arguments—on what happens on the material level when something undergoes alteration. Against this background it becomes clear that any occurrence of alteration on this level involves a change of the four fundamental qualities that are partly responsi- ble for the constitution of substances in the sublunary sphere (4.4.3) and that this, again, goes hand in hand with a change in the relevant thing’s density (4.4.4). 82 See Phys. VIII 7, 260b8. 83 See p.100, n.70. If one understands alteration in the sense in which it is explained in GC I 4, 319b10–12, namely as change with respect to πάθος, and one takes into account which examples are presented in GC I 4 for this kind of change, then it is clear that alteration covers the whole spectrum of alterations one would expect against the background of Cat. 8, where the different kinds of qualities are listed, and is not restricted to change in affection in the sense of change in perceptible qualities. For according to the examples in GC I 4 alteration covers change in quality in the sense of a change with respect to state (e.g. becoming edu- cated), condition (e.g. becoming sick), shape (e.g. angularity of bronze), and perceptible qua- lities, namely tangible qualities, colour, and taste. The only quality with respect to which according to Cat. 8 a change would be possible, but that is not explicitly mentioned in GC I 4 is the quality predicated of x in virtue of x haveing “a natural capacity or incapacity” (Cat. 8, 9a16, Transl. Ackrill). What changes in quality changes with respect to place 103 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen