Page - 126 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

continuous change, i.e. can never constitute one single change without qua- lification. But it is important to note that, although such changes cannot be consid- ered one without qualification, there nonetheless is a way in which a num- ber of changes that at least stand in the relation of one coming right after the other (ἐφεξῆς) may form a certain whole and be called continuous (συνεχές). Think of the example of the man falling into a fever directly after his run: the locomotion and the alteration that immediately follows it occur in one uninterrupted stretch of time and in this way may be said to be continuous with respect to time. For this reason Aristotle is right when he states in the third argument for locomotion’s priority in Phys. VIII 7 that the fact that there is a succession of changes in principle explains how there can be eternal change, namely with respect to the time in which the changes occur as a whole. Yet, this does not change the fact that changes which dif- fer in genus can never form one continuous whole, since it is impossible for their extremes to be one and the same. Accordingly, it is clear why certain changes, although they occur one after another (ἐφεξῆς), cannot form one single and continuous change and, therefore, a fortiori cannot form one continuous change that is eternal. From what we have seen it is clear that a change in place and a succeed- ing change in quality for instance cannot form one continuous change and that accordingly there is no way in which a combination of generically dif- ferent changes can comprise one continuous change that is eternal. But it is still unclear why Aristotle claims in Phys. VIII 7 that a combination of changes that differ from the example discussed above insofar as they are generically one but that also occur one after another (ἐφεξῆς), are not able to form one continuous change that is eternal, i.e. a kind of change of which the first unmoved mover could be the direct cause. For in contrast to generically different changes, they do have extremes that in principle may become one. Why should it be impossible for instance that there is an eter- nal change in quality or quantity? Could one not think, for example, of something eternally changing from white to black and from black to white over and over again, or of some object undergoing an increase in size until a certain magnitude is reached, and then decreasing again until a certain size is reached, and so forth ad infinitum? This question indeed is puzzling, since according to Aristotle, and as we just saw, even changes that are not one in genus may be said to form a con- tinuous whole with respect to time, although they cannot form one change in the relevant sense, i.e. in being one without qualification. What is the reason then for saying that it is impossible that a chain of succeeding changes which are all of the same genus cannot form one eternal change? For, as I have shown, this is what Aristotle presupposes in the third argu- ment by saying that the first of the two options for change being eternal is 126 All changes depend on the first locomotion, but not vice versa ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen