Page - 138 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

notions of priority and primacy. Yet, Aristotle, of course, is well aware of the fact that there are different ways in which something x can be said to be prior to something y. This may be seen for instance in his discussion of the different senses of priority in Cat. 12 or Met. V 11, but also in Physics VIII 7. For, after giving the first two arguments for the priority of locomotion and before introducing the third argument, Aristotle surprisingly starts to present three different ways in which a change x may be said to be prior to a change y. For each of these three senses he then presents an argument that is supposed to show that locomotion is prior to the other kinds of change in the respective way.68 Here are the three senses of priority as they are presented in the passage: λέγεται δὲ πρότερον [1] οὗ τε μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔσται τἆλλα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ [2] τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ [3] τὸ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν. (260b17–19) Something is called prior [1] when, if it is not also the other things will not be, while it [is] without the other things, and [2] [prior] with respect to time, and [3] with respect to essence. I will call these three ways (1) ontological priority, (2) temporal priority, and (3) priority in essence. In this chapter I focused on the argument which shows that locomotion is prior in the first sense, i.e. that of ontological priority.69 Although it has already become clear in the discussion of the pre- vious two arguments what it means to be ontologically prior to something else, I will examine Aristotle’s explicit remarks on this kind of priority here, since Aristotle certainly had good reasons for making these remarks at this point of the discussion, and it may be that they shed additional light on the notion of ontological priority. As I have already mentioned in the discussion of the first two arguments, something x has ontological priority over something y if the prerequisite for there to be y is that there be x, but the converse does not hold. In other words, y cannot be without there being x, while x can be without there being y. The relation between x and y is an asymmetric relation of ontologi- 68 It is striking that Aristotle only presents three senses of priority here, although there are more then these three senses, as for instance the discussion in Met. V 11 and Cat. 12 show. Simplicius, In Phys. 8, 1269, 6–10, argues that the reason why Aristotle only deals with these three kinds of priority here is that these are the only senses (σημαινόμενα) of being prior or posterior which are of importance when comparing changes with respect to their priority. This seems reasonable, although one could add that these are the senses of priority that for Aristotle are of special importance for showing that locomotion is prior to the other kinds of change insofar as they are related to the fact that locomotion is the primary kind of change, i.e. the change which is directly caused by the first unmoved mover. 69 For temporal priority see chapter 6 and for priority in essence see chapter 7. 138 All changes depend on the first locomotion, but not vice versa ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen