Page - 173 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

and change in quantity, then (3) locomotion is prior in essence—at least with respect to living things. But from the way in which the term ‘locomotion’ (φορά) is used in the passage it is obvious that Aristotle here means something different than in other places. Certainly it does not merely stand for ‘change in place’ in gen- eral as it does in the other arguments presented so far. For otherwise there would be no reason for claiming that locomotion “belongs” only to certain things from a certain time onwards while others do not have it at all. Every- thing that has a place can undergo a change with respect to its place. Hence, it is absurd to think that what is undergoing the process of coming to be something, e.g. to be a man, cannot undergo a change with respect to its place until certain other things belong to it, things that are usually acquired before locomotion is. A human embryo, for instance, is far from being com- plete and needs to pass through many different stages before it becomes a full-grown man. Yet, surely it is subject to change in place in its mother’s womb. Thus ‘locomotion’ certainly has a more specific meaning here. That ‘locomotion’ is employed in a special sense in this passage is made clear by Aristotle himself when he argues that locomotion does not belong to all living things, but only to those which are about to attain completion.16 When he argues that, due to (διό) the posteriority of locomotion in the coming to be of living things, there are some that may not move at all, while the ones that are nearly complete, i.e. that are reaching the end of their coming to be a certain kind of animal, have locomotion and can move. The former are “immovable” (ἀκίνητον), Aristotle tells us, “just as the plants and many genera of animals.”17 Again, there is nothing which in general prevents any kind of living thing that has a place from undergoing a change in place. For instance I may repot a plant in my garden from a shadowy to a sunny place; a sponge in the sea might drift from its original place to a new one—the same is even true of inanimate things like stones. Therefore, being immovable does not mean being incapable of undergoing any change in place at all. Aristotle’s point in the example rather is that living things like plants and certain animals, sponges for instance18, do not have locomotion in the sense that they merely undergo it passively, but rather that they lack the capacity to perform their own, i.e. self-caused, changes in place. The 16 διὸ τὰ μὲν ὅλως ἀκίνητα τῶν ζώντων δι᾽ ἔνδειαν [τοῦ ὀργάνου], οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ πολλὰ γένη τῶν ζῷων, τοῖς δὲ τελειουμένοις ὑπάρχει, Phys. VIII 7, 261a15–17: “Because of this some of the living beings are entirely incapable of moving due to a lack [of an organ], just as the plants and many genera of animals, but it belongs to those which are about to attain completion.” 17 Phys. VIII 7, 261a16–17. 18 As Simplicius, In Phys. 8, 1271, 30–32, points out, Aristotle in this passage apart from plants has beings like zoophytes in mind, to which for instance sponges belong. Locomotion is prior in essence, since it is last in coming to be 173 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen