Page - 183 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

a man’s essence and nature than (a) and (b)—especially since, due to the dependency of capacities discussed previously, (a) and (b) are also implied by (c). It is more specific for a man to have the capacity for locomotion than for growth and alteration, since animals like sponges also have the latter two, though not the first. Having the capacity to self-locomote makes a human being more what it is than alteration or growth and diminution. Thus, at least with respect to the three aforementioned capacities, one may say that the capacity which is prior in essence also is more specific to that to which it belongs. This tells us something more about what it might mean for an essential feature x of k to be prior in essence to another such feature y: if x is prior in essence to y, then x is more specific to k than y and not vice versa. That is to say, having feature x is responsible to a higher degree for and contributes more to fulfilling the form and essence of k than having feature y. This opens up a way to determine whether something is prior in essence to something else, without making reference to the coming to be of some- thing. It provides a measure by means of which one can tell whether some- thing fulfils its essence to a higher degree than something else of the same kind, or whether an essential feature is more responsible for its bearer’s ful- filment of essence than another feature. Here is another example: Aristotle would certainly agree that thinking is more specific to man than locomotion, for this is what differentiates him from all—or at least most—of the other animals which possess locomotion. Based on what I have said, ‘thinking’ is therefore prior in essence to ‘loco- motion’. That this is the case follows from the reversed priority claim: in the development of human beings, the fully developed capacity for thought is posterior to that for locomotion. Hence, according to this assumption the former also has essential priority over the latter.45 The assertion that if an essential feature is prior in essence to another one, then the feature is more specific to what its bearer is, i.e. its essence, is a substantial claim. I cannot argue for its general truth here, even though it is not unlikely that Aristotle would agree with it. Yet, I have shown that it is the case for priority in essence with respect to the three kinds of non-substantial change, and we should keep in mind that the concept of priority used to compare different kinds of change, according to Aristotle, may differ in some way from other uses of this concept. 45 This implies a substantial claim about the connection between the order in which essential features are acquired in the coming to be and their specificity: since what is later in the coming to be is prior in essence and what is more specific is prior in essence, the coming to be of a living thing proceeds from the less to the more specific. I will not argue for this claim here. Locomotion is prior in essence, since it is last in coming to be 183 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen