Seite - 100 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

4.4.2 What does it mean that condensation and rarefaction are principles of quality? I will now begin by presenting what I take to be the basic idea behind the claim that Aristotle establishes, i.e. that one “source of all affections is con- densation and rarefaction.”69 Thereby, it will also become clear that, con- trary to what some scholars think, this assumption is in perfect accordance with what is stated about the two phenomena of condensation (πύκνωσις) and rarefaction (μάνωσις) in Phys. IV 9, the passage most important for Aristotle’s conception of the two phenomena, and that the view expressed in this claim may thus be considered as Aristotle’s own. I will continue my analysis by examining the different premises on which the argument is based, an argument that as a whole is supposed to show that locomotion has ontological priority over change in quality. Aristotle’s claim that condensation and rarefaction are a source of all affections, as I will show, means that for explaining how all kinds of quali- ties, and hence all kinds of change in quality, come about one needs to refer, among other things, to these two processes, as they are at least partly responsible for there being qualities.70 The reason for this claim is presented in the next line (γάρ), which says that this is the case, because “heavy and light, soft and hard, and hot and cold seem to be some sort of densities and rarities.”71 According to this theory, if x is qualified in one of these ways, there seems to be a state of density and rarity—of the whole of, or parts of x’s body—that corresponds to having the respective quality. Furthermore, in this context Aristotle does not provide further explanation for what is stated here, which again makes it necessary to look elsewhere. But as in the 69 πάντων τῶν παθημάτων ἀρχὴ πύκνωσις καὶ μάνωσις, Phys. VIII 7, 260b8. 70 Note that Aristotle merely speaks of ἀρχή and not ἡ ἀρχή which could be read as say- ing that the two processes are the sole source and principle of these things. I take πάθημα to stand for what Aristotle calls παθός in other places and what in the context of my discussion stands for all kinds of qualities in Aristotle. My reason for doing so is that in GC, which in my view needs to be understood as the theoretical background of this passage, especially I 4, where Aristotle discusses alteration, this kind of change is explicitly described as occurring with respect to πάθος as the process in which something “changes in its own qualities” (μετ- βάλλῃ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ πάθεσιν, 319b11–12). As the examples in GC I 4 show, apart from one exception, this covers the whole spectrum of alterations that against the background of the discussion of quality in Cat. 8 seem to be possible (for more see n.83 on p.103). Another even more important reason is that in order to show that locomotion is prior to change in substance, quantity, and quality in general, it is not enough to show that it has priority over certain cases of change in quality, namely of perceptible qualities. 71 καὶ βαρὺ καὶ κοῦφον καὶ μαλακὸν καὶ σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν πυκνό- τηες δοκοῦσιν καὶ ἀραιότητες εἶναί τινες. Phys. VIII 7, 260b8–10. 100 Locomotion necessarily accompanies each of the other kinds of change ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen