Seite - 195 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

7.2.4 Making x depart from its essence by being part of a change in essence? 7.2.4.1 Alteration as part of a change in essence In chapter 3 of Physics VII Aristotle presents different arguments for the claim that alteration in the full sense occurs only in sensible things and the sensory part of the soul, and is not a change in the shape (σχῆμα), form (μορφή), or state (ἕξις) of that which undergoes the change.61 Aristotle’s first step is therefore to argue that the process through which the form or shape of a subject is changed is not, as one might think, an alteration. Rather, Aristotle claims here, this process by which the underly- ing matter takes on a certain form needs to be considered as a substantial change, namely coming to be (γένεσις), which differs significantly from alteration.62 This is not what one would expect Aristotle to say, for, as I sta- ted in the discussion of the second argument, alteration usually also covers the cases that are explicitly excluded here.63 Yet, for my purpose another, surprising remark that is made here is of importance: the coming to be of things, Aristotle tells us, by necessity seems to involve alteration. As the pas- sage in which this is stated is of special importance for my argument, I will present it here in full: ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἄτοπον ἂν δόξειεν, ἠλλοιῶσθαι τὸν ἄνθρω- πον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν γεγενημένων· ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως ἕκαστον ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τινός, οἷον τῆς ὕλης πυκνουμένης ἢ μανουμένης ἢ θερμαινομένης ἢ ψυχομένης, οὐ μέν- τοι τὰ γιγνόμενά γε ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐδ᾽ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν ἀλλοίωσίς ἐστιν. (246a4–9) Besides, it would seem absurd to speak in this way: that the man, or the house, or anything else that has come to be underwent alteration. But probably it is necessary that each thing comes to be by something being altered, as for instance by the matter being condensed, or rarefied, or heated, or cooled; the things which are coming to be, however, surely do not undergo an alteration, nor is their coming to be an alteration. If what Aristotle says here is correct, then coming to be necessarily involves alteration. Even though Aristotle is cautious in making this claim—he says that this is probably (ἴσως) the case—there is no need to think that he has serious doubts that it is true at least for some cases of coming to be, even if it is not a universal principle. For my purpose it is enough to show that 61 See Phys. VII 3, 245b3–8 and 248a6–9. 62 For the full argument see Phys. VII 3, 245b9–246a9. 63 See section 4.4.2, esp. p.100, n.70, and p.103, n.83, and their context. Locomotion alone preserves its subject’s essence 195 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen