Seite - 51 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

things are touching each other, and indeed the relation of two things touch- ing (ἅπτεσθαι) each other is defined in Phys. V 3 with respect to the things’ extremes being situated together.30 But for two things to come into contact implies that they have to come closer to each other, and accordingly either one or both of them have to change place. It is for this reason that Aristotle is able to state that the alterer “does not [always] hold the same relation [to what is altered], but sometimes is nearer and sometimes farther away from what is altered.”31 In order for that which is hot to impart its heat to some other thing that is cold, the two things have to move towards each other and touch. This change in place necessarily needs to occur before the alteration in the sense that the alterer and what is altered are in contact only after locomotion has occurred.32 If one takes it that the example of the cold becoming hot refers to the process in which food is heated in order to become a part of the body (and that in this way the thought from the first part of the argument is contin- ued), then one could explain what happens in this way:33 the food, as that alteration in general. For, as I shall argue in the next chapter, Aristotle clearly holds the view that every alteration involves a change with respect to the subject’s affections. For instance he thinks that health is connected to heat (see Phys. IV 3, 210b24–27) and therefore also that a change from being healthy to being sick— which according to Cat. 8 would count as a change in a ἕξις, i.e. in quality—involves the subject’s change with respect to the qualities of hot and cold. This is also clear from the fact that any alteration may be partly characterised as a change in respect of tangible qualities (κατὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἁπτῶν πάθη ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἐστιν, GC ΙΙ 4, 331a9–10), that again may be explained in terms of the four basic qualities of hot, cold, dry, and moist. I will argue for the claim that alteration in general involves a change in the respective thing’s affection later on in section 4.4.3. 30 λέγω […] ἅπτεσθαι δὲ ὧν τὰ ἄκρα ἅμα. Phys. V 3, 226b20–227a7: “I say that things are touching if their extremes are together.” 31 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ κινοῦν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ᾽ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐγγύτερον ὁτὲ δὲ πορρώ- τερον τοῦ ἀλλοιουμένου ἐστίν. Phys. VIII 7, 260b1–3. 32 In fact it is not only the case for alteration that what causes the respective change (τὸ κινοῦν) needs to be in contact with that which undergoes the change (τὸ κινούμενον), but also for locomotion (243a11–244b2), and for growth and diminution (see 245a11–16), that is, for all three kinds of non-substantial change (243a34–35). It is puzzling that Aristotle does not simply make use of this fact to show that change in magnitude also presupposes locomo- tion in the same sense as alteration does. The only reason I can think of is that Aristotle for some reason not only wants to show that locomotion is prior to change in quality and quan- tity, but also that alteration is prior to growth and diminution. 33 This is what Simplicius, In Phys. 8, 1265–1266, thinks. One could also think, however, that Aristotle, by using the pair of hot and cold, is referring to two of the four basic qualities which, apart from dry and moist, (which as we saw are used in the explanation of growth in GC I 5 and de An. II 4) are involved in any alteration, as they characterise the basic material components of all composite substances in the sublunary sphere. (For more on this see my discussion of the second argument, esp. section 4.4.3). Growth and diminution presuppose alteration 51 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen