Seite - 61 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

of rest and, one might think, not having undergone any prior change.60 The problem with this assumption is that it might suggest that—contrary to what Aristotle just stated in Phys. VIII 1—something x may start to change, although it was neither undergoing a change before, nor was this sudden locomotion caused by some other cause external to x, such that the observed change in place appears to take place without a cause.61 From the answer presented to this problem in Phys. VIII 2 and VIII 6 only the follow- ing is of importance for my purpose at this point: Aristotle states that it is incorrect to assume that an animal prior to moving could have been in a state of perfect rest, although it might seem so at first glance. For, as he points out, living things, or at least parts thereof, are constantly undergoing certain changes, even when in what appears to be a state of rest.62 The changes an animal undergoes constantly include, for example growth, diminution and respiration63, i.e. such that are necessary for this being to sustain itself as a living organism. Apart from this, however, in the third eternity-objection another point is discussed which poses a serious problem to what I have just presented as the reason for Aristotle’s motivation in dealing with a restricted under- standing of change in magnitude in the first argument for the priority claim. As I have stated, one might think that the first argument ultimately aims at showing that locomotion, with respect to the changes caused by a living being either directly or indirectly, is ontologically prior. Yet, in order to do so, it seems Aristotle needs to show that locomotion is prior in all liv- ing beings, including in less-obvious cases, like that of plants or other living beings that are not even capable of locomotion. Therefore, one might con- clude, Aristotle in the first argument focuses on cases of growth that occur in living beings and shows that changes in quality and quantity as they take place in living things, including non-locomotive ones, necessarily involve some preceding locomotion, but only in the sense that something, yet not necessarily the growing or altering thing, needs to undergo a change in 60 For this third objection see Phys. VIII 2, 252b17–28, VIII 2, 253a7–21, and VIII 6, 259b1–20. 61 See Phys. VIII 2, 253a8–11 and VIII 6, 259b1–6. 62 ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ἀεί τι κινούμενον ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ τῶν συμφύτων, Phys. VIII 2 253a11–12: “for we observe that there is always some connatural part of the animal organism changing” (Transl. Morison (2004), 68) My understanding of this passage is essentially based on Mori- son (2004) who argues in his paper that the discussion of the third eternity-objection does not contradict Aristotle’s view that animals are self-movers and that the orthodox view is therefore wrong which reads this passage as suggesting that Aristotle thinks that none of the changes animals undergo are actually self-caused. 63 οἷον αὔξησις φθίσις ἀναπνοή, Phys. VIII 6, 259b9, for the rest of the claim see b9– 11. The reason for the restriction of the argument’s scope 61 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen