Seite - 101 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

case of the two other sub-arguments, more information on this topic is to be found elsewhere in his work, especially in Phys. IV and De Generatione et Corruptione, which in my view lays out the theoretical background to this argument. With respect to the terms πύκνωσις and μάνωσις we are in a situation similar to the one we faced with δίακρισις and σύγκρισις. Both terms are often used by Aristotle in order to refer to certain theories of his predeces- sors.72 Furthermore, with respect to Aristotle’s usage of both terms this was taken as a reason for denying that the second argument presents Aristotle’s own view.73 In fact, the two terms are also stated in the aforementioned passage of Phys. VIII 9 as part of one of his predecessors’ doctrines.74 But the most important motivation for saying that Aristotle here is rather pre- senting an argument consisting partly of a predecessor’s non-Aristotelian assumptions is that the way in which the terms πύκνωσις and μάνωσις are used by Aristotle in the passage of Phys. VIII 7 appears to be incompati- ble with his own theory. But unlike aggregation and segregation, the concepts of condensation and rarefaction are used by Aristotle in other places in the Physics not merely in order to refer to certain doctrines of the Presocratics, but as a part of his own theory. The passages that are of importance for us are found in Phys. IV in the context of Aristotle’s discussion of the void. What is stated there is in line with what is said about the two processes in the second argument for the priority of locomotion, although some interpreters of Phys. VIII seem to doubt this.75 Of particular importance for my purposes is the use of the two terms in Phys. IV 9.76 In this chapter Aristotle states his own theory of condensation and rarefaction and in doing so explicitly draws a connection between the qualities of heavy (βαρύ) and light (κοῦφον) and the products of conden- 72 See for instance Phys. IV 9, 216b22–24, and Phys. VIII 9, 265b30–31. 73 See Wagner (1967), 688, Zekl (1988), 289, n.114, and Graham (1999), 122–123. Addi- tionaly, Philoponus, In Phys. 8, 896, 30–32, and also Wagner and Graham, argue that the use of δοκοῦσιν (b10) and λέγεται (b12) indicates that this is not Aristotle’s own point of view. 74 266b30–31. It is correct that πύκνωσις and μάνωσις are mentioned in this passage, yet they are introduced as explaining generation and corruption, while the role they play in the constitution of qualities that is mentioned in VIII 7 is not stated. But the mere fact that both terms are mentioned in the discussion of the theories of Aristotle’s predecessors alone does not show that they are always used in order to refer to those theories. 75 Again see the places in Wagner, Zekl, and Graham (see n.73). Wagner and Zekl merely state that the concepts of πύκνωσις and μάνωσις as they are used in Phys. VIII 7 are incom- patible with the theory developed about them in Phys. IV, however, neither Wagner nor Zekl says why this is supposed to be the case. 76 Besides Phys. IV 9 Aristotle also uses the two concepts as his own in Phys. IV 5, 212b2– 3 and, as I will show later on, in various other places. What changes in quality changes with respect to place 101 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen