Seite - 114 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

that its basic material parts or components do so. The converse, however, does not hold: there is no need for locomotion to be accompanied by any of the other changes. In fact, I have shown that it is a specific feature of loco- motion that in the strict sense its subject does not change in any other respect than place and that its inner order is left completely untouched, so to speak. But since locomotion therefore does not entail the occurrence of any of the other kinds of change, while each of the other types cannot occur without locomotion, it again became clear that locomotion has ontological priority over the other three kinds of change, although in a different sense than that presented in the first argument for locomotion’s priority. My analysis has also shown that the argument as a whole, contrary to what many scholars say, not only can be read as a statement of Aristotle’s own theory, but should be read as such, for several compelling reasons. There is no need to take the argument as one in which Aristotle merely argues from his predecessors’ point of view in order to show that the prior- ity of locomotion also would follow from their partly mistaken assump- tions. In fact the argument presents important reasons for the assumption that locomotion is the primary kind of change. Yet, it has also become clear that Aristotle makes use of terms that were coined by his predecessors and that he himself seems to use only in certain contexts. I hold that he has at least two reasons for doing so. These reasons also tell us something about the specific role the second argument plays in the larger project of showing the primacy of locomotion. Firstly, using these notions helps to focus on what one might call the material side of the differ- ent kinds of change. This special perspective on the phenomenon of change enables Aristotle to show that locomotion is ontologically prior to the other kinds of change from this specific point of view as well: with respect to the most basic level of explanation, namely that of the elements and principles of composite substances. Without locomotion none of the other kinds of change could occur, while the occurrence of change in place does not depend on any of the other kinds. This leads us to the second point. This special perspective also made it possible for Aristotle to reject a view held by his predecessors, namely that there may be other processes that are more fundamental than locomotion and that accordingly should be called primary. If this were the case, it might threaten Aristotle’s claim that locomotion as the primary, i.e. most funda- mental, change is the only possible candidate for being directly caused by the first unmoved mover. He was successful in this respect as well. 114 Locomotion necessarily accompanies each of the other kinds of change ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen