Seite - 128 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

ing that of the different ways in which things may be, the best possible way will always be realized in nature. Based on this assumption it accordingly follows that the first and better of the two ways in which change may exist continuously, namely by there being one single change that is eternal, must necessarily be the case. Since the only candidate for this change, as Aristotle will claim, is locomotion, Aristotle finally draws the conclusion that for this reason locomotion must be primary.37 All this of course has not been made clear thus far. First, of all the pre- mise about nature of course states that the better is the case in nature, if it is possible (ἂν ᾖ δυνατόν).38 Yet, it has not been shown so far that there may be a change that is one single change in the strict sense and that at the same time is eternal. Furthermore, the assumption that only locomotion can be this special sort of change has not been discussed yet. And even if these two assumptions were true, it still needs to be explained how exactly their truth is supposed to show locomotion’s primacy. As to the first point, we have seen that Aristotle at the beginning of Phys. VIII 7 raises the question whether there is one eternal change, and that it therefore is one of the tasks of chapters 7 and 8 to provide an answer to this question. The same, however, is also true for the second point, i.e. for the yet unproven claim that locomotion needs to be considered as the only change capable of being one and eternal in the necessary sense, because this may be seen as an answer to the second of the three questions that Aristotle raised at the beginning of VIII 7, namely which kind of change the single eternal change is, assuming that it can exist.39 Therefore, Aristotle at this point is obviously taking it for granted that such a change can exist, but also that this single eternal change “can be no other [change] than locomotion”, and indeed he explicitly states that both facts will be shown later on and therefore may be presupposed as given for now.40 In fact, we will see that both points indeed will be shown to be true 37 ταύτην οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ φοράν, ἀνάγκη τὴν φορὰν εἶναι πρώτην. Phys. VIII 7, 260b25–26: since “this can be no other change than locomotion, loco- motion must be primary.” 38 Phys. VIII 7, 260b23. 39 For the formulation of the two questions see 260a21–23. For more on the significance of these questions see section 2.4.3. 40 δυνατὸν δὲ συνεχῆ εἶναι (δειχθήσεται δ᾽ ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω), καὶ ταύτην οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ φοράν. Phys. VIII 7, 260b23–25: “it is possible for [change] to be continuous—this will be shown later but let us just suppose it for now”. That both assumptions are presupposed by Aristotle is clear from the fact that the truth of neither of them has been shown so far, but will be established in the discussion “later on”. This is also suggested by the grammar, as the phrase starting after the brackets in 260b24, and in which the second of the assumptions is stated, needs to belong to the ὑποκείσθω in the 128 All changes depend on the first locomotion, but not vice versa ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen