Seite - 165 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

for fulfilling the essence and the form that something has by belonging to a certain kind. I take the following to be a basic reconstruction of the argu- ment that is supposed to show that this claim is correct: (1) If x is posterior to y in the coming to be of living things, then x is prior in essence to y with respect to living things. (2) In the coming to be of living things locomotion is posterior to altera- tion, growth and diminution. (3) Therefore, locomotion is prior in essence to alteration, growth and diminution with respect to living things. The reason why Aristotle presents this argument is that he needs to deal with a problem that had already been raised in the discussion of the fourth argument. As we have seen, the fourth argument was supposed to show that locomotion has priority in time (ἐν χρόνῳ) over any other kind of change.1 Yet, in the discussion of the argument it was also stated that—on a smaller scale, namely with respect to each living thing that has a coming to be— locomotion is not primary at all, but on the contrary even is the last of the changes (ὑστάτη τῶν κινήσεων).2 The reason for this assumption is that, of the different kinds of change, locomotion in the process of the develop- ment of a living thing comes last and in fact only belongs to those things which are about to reach the end of their coming to be, or already have completed it.3 In answer to this objection Aristotle rightly claims that the coming to be of any living thing is temporally preceded by an eternal loco- motion that is causally responsible for the generation of this living thing and for this reason also precedes the changes that supposedly were prior to locomotion. Nonetheless, Aristotle still seems to think he needs to say more about the fact that locomotion is last in the development of certain living things and how this fits into his theory that change in place is primary. For this reason he picks up the fact about the posteriority of locomotion at the beginning of the fifth argument again and shows that locomotion is prior in a more important sense—namely prior in essence—not only in spite of, but because of its posteriority in the development of living things.4 This 1 For the following see chapter 6. 2 ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς μὲν ὁτουοῦν τῶν ἐχόντων γένεσιν τὴν φορὰν ἀναγκαῖον ὑστάτην εἶναι τῶν κινήσεων, Phys. VIII 7, 260b30–32: “But in any single thing of those which have coming to be locomotion must be the last of the changes.” 3 μετὰ γὰρ τὸ γενέσθαι πρῶτον ἀλλοίωσις καὶ αὔξησις, φορὰ δ᾽ ἤδη τετελειωμέ- νων κίνησίς ἐστιν, Phys. VIII 7, 260b32–33: “For after coming to be first alteration and growth [come to the thing], while locomotion is a change of things that already have achieved completion.” 4 This again makes clear that Aristotle has very good reasons for showing that locomotion is primary in different respects and not, as Graham (1999), 127, suggests in the part of his Locomotion is prior in essence, since it is last in coming to be 165 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen