Seite - 213 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

ble, while the converse does not hold, i.e. that locomotion has ontological priority in this respect as well. As I then pointed out in my discussion, Aristotle in the fourth argument, by building on what was shown in the previous argument, makes clear that this locomotion also has priority in time, although there are facts that seem to contradict this assumption. Since eternal things can only change with respect to place, it is clear that the change which the first unmoved mover causes directly and which the primum mobile undergoes—at least in this respect—can only be locomotion. For this reason, i.e. in virtue of this first eternal change being locomotion, it is clear that change in place is prior to any instance of one of the other three types of change, since an eternal change is always prior in time to any non-eternal one. As we have seen, however, Aristotle devotes most of this discussion to dealing with a possible objection to this claim: contrary to what one might think, the fact that an animal’s ability to self-locomote comes to it at a rather late point of its development fits very well into Aristotle’s theory. I have also shown that this fact in the same way does not imply that the generation of something x always needs to precede x’s change in place, and that generation therefore does not have to be considered the primary kind of change. For, since the locomotion of the heavenly spheres and bodies, especially that of the sun, is responsible to a certain degree for any occurrence of generation, it is clear that for each generation (as well as for any other change which the gener- ated thing undergoes afterwards) there is a locomotion that occurs earlier than, i.e. is prior in time to, this generation (and the other changes). The fact that change in place has temporal priority in this way again made clear that of the different kinds of change locomotion alone can be considered an appropriate candidate for the change that is directly caused by the first unmoved mover. The discussion of the last of the five arguments showed that locomotion also has priority in essence over the other kinds of change. As we have seen, Aristotle shows this by means of two sub-arguments, the first presenting reasons for the claim that locomotion has this kind of priority with respect to perishable self-movers, and the second proving the same with respect to eternal things that function as causes of change for other things. In examin- ing the first sub-argument it became clear that locomotion has priority in essence in such living things, since their being able to move themselves as a whole is more specific to their being what they are in the full sense as mem- bers of a certain species than their having alteration or growth and diminu- tion. That locomotion is last in the process of such beings’ generation there- fore turned out to be an expression of this kind of priority. As we have seen, the second sub-argument then made use of the fact that locomotion in contrast to the other three kinds of change in no way entails its subject’s departing from what it is, i.e. it preserves its subject’s essence best. Because Conclusion 213 ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen