Seite - 214 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

it was shown that eternal things can only change with respect to place for precisely the reason that they must not undergo a change with respect to their being, it became clear that locomotion is prior in essence with respect to eternal things as well. This is of special importance since it again shows that locomotion alone can be the change that is caused directly by the first unmoved mover, since the eternal primum mobile can only change with respect to this weakest kind of change, which at the same time is of such a nature that it can be undergone eternally without thereby posing any threat to its subject’s essence. The conclusion, therefore, was that Aristotle, by making these arguments, accordingly shows that locomotion is prior in essence to all of the other types of change with respect to both perishable and eternal things and insofar as it is prior in this way in all things that (apart from the unmoved mover) may serve as causes of change in the cos- mos. As my discussion of the five arguments has shown, Aristotle is therefore finally able to conclude that these arguments have made clear that of the four kinds of change, i.e. that with respect to quality, quantity, substance, and place, the last, that is, locomotion must be the primary one.1 But from a broader perspective, these five arguments thereby presented reasons for the claim that the only appropriate candidate for the eternal change which is caused by the first unmoved mover and on which all other changes in this sense depend must be locomotion. For, as I have shown, and as indeed also became clear especially with respect to the last three arguments, Aristotle, in determining which is the primary kind of change and in showing that this is change in place, is interested primarily in making clear that the type of change that can be eternal is also primary in the respects necessary for being the change which has its direct source in the first unmoved mover.2 1 ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν τῶν κινήσεων ἡ φορὰ πρώτη, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων, Phys. VIII 7, 261a27–28: “That therefore of the changes locomotion is primary is clear from these [pre- sented arguments].” 2 That this is what Aristotle has in mind here is also clear from the remark that follows right after the presentation of the fifth argument in 261a23–26. What these lines say, in my view, is that because of the fact that locomotion is primary in the different ways, it is also clear that—due to its primacy—it is the kind of change which self-movers like animals cause, which is in perfect accordance with VIII 6, 259b1–16, where the latter claim was made and shown to be true. Although, as I am well aware, this passage may be and in fact usually is taken to be yet another argument for locomotion’s priority, I do not think that this is the case. Firstly, in contrast to most of the other arguments, no reference to the priority claim is made in these four lines. But most of all this ‘argument’ neither fits into the line of thought that connects the last three arguments, namely the reference to the first eternal change, nor to their arrange- ment as it is outlined in 260b16–18, since it cannot be read as an argument for locomotion’s priority in essence. 214 Conclusion ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen