Seite - 122 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

But here as well it is important to have the context of this passage in mind: the passage is not merely about explaining how change in principle may be eternal—since this has already been discussed at the beginning of Phys. VIII; although this argument as we will see stands on its own, it none- theless is an argument for locomotion’s primacy over the other kinds of change, i.e. for the claim that the change of which the first unmoved mover is the direct source must be locomotion. But as is stated in Phys. VIII 6, from the assumption that there needs to be one single unmoved mover it follows that this primary change must be one and continuous.18 Against this background it becomes clear why the first of the two ways in which change may exist continuously is favoured: basically, Aristotle tells us, it is correct that eternal change may be explained by the two aforementioned options; but when it comes to explaining the one eternal change which the unmoved mover causes directly, the second option does not work any longer and may be excluded, for a change that consists of a sequence of changes does not seem to Aristotle to be one and continuous. This, how- ever, must be the case for the change of which the first unmoved mover is the direct source. Aristotle goes on to argue that the only kind of change which can be eternal, one and continuous is locomotion, from which it fol- lows that locomotion is primary, because only it can be the kind of change that is directly caused by the first unmoved mover.19 Yet, as we have seen, Aristotle does not explain in this argument why it is that two or more different changes, one of which follows directly after the other, cannot be continuous and form one eternal change. Rather, since his reasons for doing so are far from obvious, he seems to presuppose that we are familiar with them.20 18 See Phys. VIII 6, 259a15–18. 19 The question why the first of the two options is more appropriate and better is hardly discussed by most commentators, although it is essential to make the connection to the rest of Phys. VIII that I have pointed out, for without this it is unclear why the first of the options should be preferred. Aquinas thinks that the reason for preferring option (1) lies in the fact that an eternal change that is consecutive has “more of the nature [ratio] of unity and eter- nity.” (Transl. Blackwell et al. (1999)) (“plus habet de ratione unitatis et perpetuitatis”, In Phys., L. VIII, l. XIV, 1091). Yet, he does not explain in what way it belongs more to the account of eternity to be one and continuous. The only one who tries to explain why it is bet- ter for the eternal to be one single continuous change by relating the argument to the broader context is Philoponus, who points out In Phys. 8, 897, 19, that this option is to be preferred, since a continuous change is the one which appropriately may be said to have its cause in god (ἐγγὺς γὰρ τοῦτο τοῦ θείου). Thereby Philoponus makes it clear that he, too, thinks that Aristotle here is talking about the eternal change whose direct source is the first unmoved mover. 20 In Phys. VIII 6 Aristotle of course makes the claim that only changes which are contin- uous may be one and that those which consist of one change following after another (ἐφεξῆς) are not, but he does not present a reason for this claim there. See Phys. VIII 6, 259a16–18. 122 All changes depend on the first locomotion, but not vice versa ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen