Seite - 168 - in The Priority of Locomotion in Aristotle’s Physics

the things that are posterior in coming to be are prior in form and in essence (e.g. man to boy and human being to seed; for the one already has its form, and the other does not)9 (Met. IX 8, 1050a4–7) I will call this assertion that what is posterior in coming to be is prior in essence, the reversed priority claim. That this assumption for Aristotle in both passages derives from the fact that everything that is coming to be moves towards a principle, i.e. its form, is clear from the way in which the two assumptions are connected with one another in both of the texts: in the Physics-passage the reversed priority claim is presented as a conclusion (ὥστε) drawn from the observation stated in sentence (1). In Met. IX 8 Aristotle justifies the reversed priority claim (ὅτι) by referring to the incomplete’s proceeding towards its end. At least in the passage from the Physics nothing further is said about how this assumption follows from sen- tence (1). It also does not present a full account of what it means for x to be prior in essence to y. Aristotle here is merely stating the first premise of the argument for locomotion’s priority in essence and seems to presuppose that the reader is acquainted with both the reasons for this assumption and the notion of priority in essence. This is not the case in the passage from the Metaphysics in which two examples are presented to make the two points clearer. In the first example Aristotle compares a boy and a man, in the second a seed and a human Aristotle by τῇ φύσει πρότερον means the same as by πρότερον κατ᾽ οὐσίαν without say- ing this explicitly. This is clear firstly from the fact that in this passage from the Physics he uses both names for the same kind of priority (see 261a14 and 19–20), and secondly, because this argument is introduced as one for the priority in essence of locomotion (see 260b15–19). It is important to note that Aristotle’s understanding of πρότερον κατ᾽ ουσίαν and τῇ φύσει, respectively, in Physics VIII is not identical with that of priority κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν in Met. V 11. For one of the different ways in which something may be prior κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν according to the Metaphysics is identical with the first one Aristotle pre- sented in Phys. VIII 7, namely the one I called ontological priority (see sections 3.6 and 5.4.1). Nevertheless, it is significant that Aristotle in Met. V 11, 1019a1–4, seems to think that prior- ity κατ᾽ οὐσίαν is the same as priority κατὰ φύσιν, as this suggests that he in general uses both terms in order to refer to one and the same kind of priority. This, too, supports the assumption that in Phys. VIII 7 as well, Aristotle means the same by πρότερον κατ᾽ οὐσίαν as by πρότερον κατὰ φύσιν. Simplicius, In Phys. 8, 1269, 10–12, however, seems to think that Aristotle here in Phys. VIII 7 in contrast to Met. V divides (διεῖλεν) priority in essence and in nature and treats them as independent of each other. This is clearly wrong for as I just stated Aristotle in one and the same argument states that locomotion is shown to be prior in nature (τῇ φύσει, 261a13–15) and in essence (κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, 261a19–20) by this argument. At the same time, confusingly, Simplicius, as his statements on the 5th argument show (1271, 23–28), seems to be very aware of this fact. 9 τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα (οἷον ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπέρματος· τὸ μὲν ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δ᾽ οὔ) (Transl. Ross with mod.). 168 Locomotion is prior in essence ISBN Print: 9783525253069 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647253060 © 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen